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  Rural counties in the U.S. Rocky Mountain States have historically experienced oil and 
gas cycles that increase employment opportunities and income during early and peak 
phases, but in the long run are unable to sustain growth.  This paper examines the 
important question of how counties can use rents obtained from oil and gas extraction to 
sustain growth after a boom.  Other research focuses on whether resource abundance is a 
curse or a blessing and explores political and market mechanisms to explain the 
relationship between resources and observed growth.  The theory of weak sustainability 
argues that if rents from the extraction of non-renewable resources are reinvested into 
other forms of capital growth can be sustained.  Using panel data from 1969-1998, I use a 
difference in differences fixed effects model to test the theory of weak sustainability 
using local government spending as a proxy for investment choices.  I find that boom 
counties do receive rents and do spend a statistically significant higher amount on 
highways and education.  With some limitations, I also find high per capita changes in 
highway spending are related to lower per capita income levels in the post bust period, 
while high per capita changes in education were related to higher levels of per capita 
income for the same period.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
  Rural communities that have historically been dependent on natural resource extraction for 
economic growth are particularly susceptible to booms and busts.  Booms occur when new 
discoveries are made or when commodity prices rise.  Then when prices fall busts occur and the 
area can be worse off than before the boom occurred.  The boom can create an influx of non-
local, and in many cases transient, workers.  This can diminish social cohesion.  Housing prices 
may be driven upward which can drive out permanent residents.  Unemployment rates may 
increase from pre-boom rates, because population has increased but jobs outside of the natural 
resource industry have diminished.  Other jobs may diminish because the upward pressure on 
wages causes closure of other businesses.  This may lower per capita income from pre-boom 
levels.  The extra population may result in excess usage of community infrastructure and natural 
amenities making the area less attractive to new populations.  In short, the idea of a boom sounds 
appealing because employment opportunities and income rise quickly, but in reality may be 
detrimental to a community. 
  New discoveries and increases in commodity prices can create new communities or bring new 
life to stagnant communities.  At some point commodity prices begin to fall and a bust period 
follows.  During the bust, employment opportunities, incomes, and populations fall.   There is a 
common bumper sticker in the Rocky Mountain States - “Please God, just give me one more oil 
boom, I promise not to blow it next time.”  The hope is the next time they will save and invest 
during the boom to improve sustainable well-being after the boom.  The cycle is so prevalent the 
Center for the American West held a conference in 2002 entitled Boom and Bust in the American 
West.  The conference was a gathering of researchers and policymakers designed to provide 
insights to westerners on the role of the boom and bust cycle in the American West.  One of the 
seven desired qualities of a sustainable west, detailed in the conference report, is a more precise 
wording of the common bumper sticker, “A West that takes advantage of the opportunities 
presented by a boom, to make long term investments that would soften the severity of a future 
bust” (Limerick 2002). This goal forms the basis of this research – how can local governments 
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take advantage of the opportunities and invest rents to sustain growth rates and mitigate the 
severity of a bust?  
  Rural communities in the Rocky Mountain west of the United States have been particularly 
susceptible to the boom and bust cycle since the 1540 failed Spanish expedition (Limerick 2002). 
Since that time, communities have sprouted and died based on coal, gold, copper, oil and gas, 
and the presence of other natural resources. Oil and gas booms have been particularly important 
in shaping communities of the Rocky Mountains since the middle of the last century because of 
vast new discoveries and large fluctuations in prices.  Florence, Colorado has the claim to fame 
of being the second commercial drilled oilfield in the United States (1860s), and the first in the 
Rocky Mountains (Colorado Oil and Gas Association 2012).  Wyoming’s first commercial oil 
sale of 150 barrels to Union Pacific Railroad also occurred in the late 1860s (Roberts n.d.). But it 
was almost 50 years later when the first Wyoming boom occurred in 1908 near Casper 
(American Oil and Gas Historical Society n.d.).  New Mexico’s first commercial drilling 
occurred in 1922 in the San Juan Basin.  Utah’s oil and gas history is more recent with the first 
commercial drilling occurring in the Unita Basin in 1948.  And, in North Dakota the first 
discovery was of the vast Williston Basin in 1951 (American Oil and Gas Historical Society 
2017).  
  Two factors ensure that the west will continue to experience booms and will have the 
opportunity to finds methods to sustain growth after the boom.  First, the United States became 
an exporter of natural gas for the first time in 2016.  And second, as illustrated in Figure 1 there 
are many large shale plays in the region.  Haelefe and Morton (2009) argue for slowing the pace 
of oil and gas development and production as a method to improve long-term outcomes.  
However, it seems unlikely that small rural communities will have the ability to impact world oil 
and gas prices or alter the pace of development.  Research focusing on how local policymakers 
can invest incomes to improve outcomes will provide valuable insights.  
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Figure 1: Shale plays in the lower 48 states 
 
  The importance of studying this question, of how rural communities can invest during booms to 
minimize the impacts during the busts, goes beyond gaining a better understanding of the boom 
and bust cycle.  Rural communities in the United States are having trouble retaining populations 
and improving the well-being of their citizens, particularly those that are more remote, and they 
are important to a region. In the west, these communities are important for food, energy, water, 
and economy and many are struggling both economically and socially (Headwaters Economics 
2017). In addition, they serve as gateways and managers of vast areas of public lands.  These 
vast public lands bring appreciation of open space and sense of place to communities which 
encourage them to focus on sustainable development rather than population growth (Power 
1996).  Figure 2 highlights how many counties in the Rocky Mountain are classified as level 
four, living 15 minutes or further from a population above 2,500 and 60 minutes or more to a 
population above 50,000, for remoteness.   
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Figure 2: Remoteness level of counties in the United States 
 
  The impact of booms is part of a larger question on the role of resource abundance for growth 
and development.  Economic studies of resource abundance tend to focus on the presence of 
resources and patterns of development.  Booms provide an opportunity to study how rents from 
these resources flow through the economy.  Others mostly study how the flow impacts current 
measures of welfare rather than development.  To understand how resource abundance, and the 
extraction of those resources during booms, impact well-being in the future we need to examine 
how income increases are spent.  This study builds upon other research by examining impacts of 
oil and gas booms on local government revenue and spending and the impact of spending 
choices on growth patterns in the bust and post-bust period.   
  Spending of additional incomes can be for current welfare or for future welfare (see Figure 3 
for a description of measurements and indexes of current and future well-being).  Consumption 
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and investment choices are made in the private and public sector.  Public choices are compelling 
because they impact the desirability of a location and its’ ability to attract and maintain residents. 
According to Keller (2000), the leading indicators of deep rural survival are the presence of 
quality education institutions, cluster activities in the local area, sustainable base populations of 
5,000 or more, and a balance between retired and working populations.  Public spending and 
investment choices can influence each of these indicators and therefore can influence outcomes 
during busts. 
 Current welfare Current wealth (Capacity to generate future welfare) 
Economic 
Measures 
 
Income 
Consumption 
Wages 
Employment 
 
Physical capital 
Human Capital 
Broader welfare 
Measures 
Well-being 
Quality of life 
 
Physical capital 
Human capital 
Environmental quality 
Social capital 
 
Figure 3: Classification of terms 
 
  The goal of this study is to ask if, and how, local government choices during the peak boom 
improves outcomes during the bust period through capital investments in rural communities. 
More specifically, I ask the following two questions. First, did local government revenues and 
expenditures increase in boom counties, relative to non-boom counties, during the boom cycle?  
And, second, do increased investments into other forms of capital during the early and peak 
boom period improve a community’s ability to sustain the pace of development after the boom 
ends?  
  The next chapter, Chapter 2, examines the how the economic literature of resource abundance 
and booms helps to answer impacts of resources on economic and welfare measures during 
different time periods and phases of the boom cycle, but has yet to extend studies to explore why 
particular impacts happen during the bust.  Chapter 3 uses sustainable development and 
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community economic development theory and studies to provide a framework for analyzing how 
local government investments during a boom create new wealth to be used to improve outcomes 
during the bust. Chapter 4 looks at the data used to perform my analysis. Chapter 5 presents the 
two stages of the analysis.  The first stage examines whether local government revenues and 
expenditures increase during the early and peak boom period in boom counties.  The second 
stage analyzes how large increases in local government investment impact outcomes during the 
bust period.  In Chapter 6 assumptions are tested, robustness is checked, and limitations are 
discussed.  In the final chapter, contributions of the study and ideas for further research are 
presented.  
  
7 
 
Chapter 2: Resources in the economics literature 
 
  The starting point of most research on resource abundance and the impact of booms is the 
increased level of employment and income in the specific resource sector.  From that point 
research branches into several theoretical, methodological, and geographical directions.  Most 
research to date has focused on the level and duration of the income and employment increases, 
increases in employment and income in other sectors or geographic regions, and mechanisms 
causing changes in other sectors.  The exploration of mechanisms causing changes to other 
sectors is based on theories that diversification of the economy will improve the opportunities for 
future well-being in the economy. However, a gap exists in studies that explore how the choice 
of spending for current consumption or investing for future potential consumption impact 
outcomes during the bust and post-bust periods.  Filling this gap first requires examination of 
whether economies make different spending choices, between current well-being and future 
well-being, during the boom. And, then how these choices impact future well-being, that is, well-
being during the bust and post-bust period.  This is important because economies with higher 
level of investment of the additional income should be more capable of sustaining well-being 
levels after the boom. 
  There are competing theories regarding the impact of resource abundance on development.  The 
positive role of resource abundance was first put forth by classical economic theory. Classical 
economists hypothesized that economies with abundance of natural resources have a 
comparative advantage in trade with others (Ricardo 1817) and increased opportunities for 
agglomeration (Smith 1776). Mechanisms through which agglomeration occur are sharing 
facilities, sharing suppliers, sharing the gains from individual specialization, sharing a labor pool, 
better matching, and learning (Puga 2010).   
  Evidence in support of this theory has not been observed empirically. A phenomena that has 
been noticed since World War II, is that countries abundant in natural resources have been 
slower to grow than countries with relatively low levels of natural resources. Several reasons 
have been put forth to explain this phenomena, both economic and institutional, and are well 
outlined by Venables (2016). The most commonly known explanation, labelled Dutch disease, is 
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that the high exports of natural resources cause an increase in the country’s exchange rate.  This 
results in contraction in the manufactured sector.  This contraction then leads to the loss of 
learning-by-doing (if there are production externalities from manufacturing) and slows economic 
growth.   
  There are other theories that also explain slow growth in resource abundant countries.  Sachs 
and Warner (1997) explain it is not necessary for production externalities from manufacturing to 
be present to slow growth in countries with large levels of natural resources.  Growth can also be 
slowed by choices made by multiple generations in a resource abundant economy to opt out of 
additional education, higher economic rents leading to rent seeking behavior, and the volatility of 
the price level of the natural resources.  Additional mechanisms are negative genuine savings by 
the economy in anticipation of better times in the future and unstainable policies (Van der Ploeg 
2012). Unstable policies are the result of weak institutions and allow rent seeking behavior to 
occur. 
  Regional studies have been conducted to study within country resource abundance because this 
allows for controlling the institutional weaknesses plaguing country level studies.  By controlling 
for country level institutions, researchers are able to focus on other mechanisms which improve 
or hinder growth in resource abundant economies.  The results of within country studies are 
mixed in whether resource abundance hinders or improves growth.  Fleming, Measham, and 
Paredes (2015) studied regions in Australia and found that in most instances abundant resources 
have proved beneficial to economic growth.  Dube and Polese (2015) examined 135 urban areas 
in Canadian and found that resource abundance proved positive in about half the cases and 
negative in the other half.    
  Several studies have also been conducted in the United States.  Michaels (2011) found a 
positive relationship between oil abundance and long-term economic growth within the Southern 
US from 1889-1990.  In 1889 oil abundant counties were similar to all other counties because oil 
had not been discovered.  In exploring the difference in growth patterns for oil abundant counties 
through 1990, Michaels finds they had higher population growth, higher per capita incomes, and 
better infrastructure.   More specifically, he finds evidence of agglomeration for resource 
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abundant counties.  An important difference is that the counties in the south are not hindered by 
the level of remoteness found in the Rocky Mountain States.  
  In the most comprehensive study in terms of length of time period, Clay and Partnykh (2016) 
analyze US states for the period from 1880-2012 and find the impact of natural resources on the 
growth of per capita income was dependent on the resource, the time period, whether there was 
an increase or decrease in the resource and the empirical model specification. Model 
specification includes the choice of dependent variable, measures of resources, estimation 
techniques and time frames.   
  In the absence of clear evidence for either a positive or negative impact of resource abundance 
on growth, others have studied how a resource boom impacts current welfare measures.  Power 
(1996) summarizes it well by saying, “Because mining is relatively unstable owing 
to…fluctuating commodity prices…, it is a laboratory of sorts in which to study the impact of 
changes in one sector’s employment and income on the rest of the economy.” Within the United 
States, studies of the 1970s and more recent oil and gas booms have focused on the impact of the 
boom on employment and income in other sectors of the economy. 
  Weber (2014) and Brown (2014), studying shorter and more recent time periods find positive 
impacts to employment and income from increased oil and gas development from 2000 to 2010 
(Weber 2014) and 2011 (Brown 2014).  Weber studies counties in Oklahoma, Texas, Louisiana, 
and Arkansas, while Brown looks at impacts in these four states plus New Mexico, Colorado, 
and Wyoming.  Brown finds that one rig added 171 jobs in the long run in the time period he 
studied, but argues that as technological advances continue employment will be less responsive 
to changes in drilling.  This argument further advances reasons for focusing on how county 
governments can utilize rents from resource extraction to improve prospects for future growth.   
Weber (2012) also found positive impacts between oil and gas production and per capita income 
and employment in three Rocky Mountain States, Colorado, Wyoming, and Texas, from 2000-
2008.  These studies are interested in determining whether the employment and income effects 
predicted by input-output models were accurate.  While they all find positive effects to income 
and employment, the effects are well below those estimated by input-output models. 
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  Two other studies that focus on western states have also found short-term positive impacts in 
boom counties, but have found negative impacts during bust and post bust periods.  Haggerty et 
al. (2014) examine the effects of specialization in oil and gas production from 1980 through 2011 
and conclude as the length of time of specialization increases the effects to per capita income 
decrease and the county experiences significantly higher crime rates and lower percentages of 
population with a college degree.  Jacobsen and Parker (2016) examine the effects of being in a 
boom county from 1969-1998, a clear oil and gas cycle.  They find boom counties experience 
higher increases in per capita income, employment, and population growth.  They are 
particularly interested in outcomes during the bust and post-bust period and find that on average 
boom counties began the cycle with high per capita incomes, but by the post-bust period on 
average had lower per capita incomes.     
    The three studies on western states use different time periods, geographic regions, 
specifications of what constitutes a boom, and empirical methods for analyzing impacts.  Weber 
(2012) examines counties in Colorado, Texas, and Wyoming from 1998/99 – 2007/08 using a 
triple difference in differences empirical method and finds increases in oil production in a county 
increased employment and median household incomes.  Weber divides the counties by 
calculating the change in gas production from the base year 1998/99 to 2007/08.  Twenty five 
percent of the counties experienced an increase in oil and gas production, fifty percent 
experienced no change, and the last twenty five percent experienced decreases.  The twenty five 
percent experiencing increases are labeled as boom counties.  Counties that share a border with a 
boom county are excluded from the analysis to control for spill-overs.   
  Haggerty et al. (2104) take a different approach expanding both the time period, geographic 
region, and the scope of impacts. Their study covers six of the Rocky Mountain States from 
1980-2011: Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. Using the 
average percentage of per capita income from oil and gas production in the period from 1980-
1982, the height of one oil peak, they find the length of the boom has statistically significant 
impacts on per capita income, the average violent and property crimes rate, and the percentage of 
adults with a college education. Their method controls for time invariant differences in counties 
by using control variables.     
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  Jacobsen and Parker (2016) provide a time period and empirical approach for exploring how 
booms impact local government revenue and spending as well as how choices made during the 
early to peak boom period influence outcomes in the bust and post bust.  They use the period 
from 1969-1998 and data from new drilling to examine how income and employment are 
impacted in boom counties during various phases of the boom.  Their difference in differences 
approach and the use of a time period that covers an entire oil and gas boom cycle provides 
insights into how boom counties are affected throughout the cycle.  The length of their time 
provides sufficient length to use six observations of five year government spending data.  In 
addition, there is sufficient time to test how choices made earlier in the boom impact outcomes 
towards the end of the process.  The model and time period of Jacobsen and Parker (2016) 
provide an opportunity to delve deeper and explore how choices made impact outcomes after.   
  According to current economic literature, there is not a consensus on whether resource 
abundance contributes to or hinders development or whether communities are better or worse 
after a boom.  This leaves open the question of how choices made during the boom can improve 
outcomes after the boom.  Sustainable development and community economic development 
provide theory and framework to help answer this question. 
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Chapter 3: Sustainable rural community development framework 
 
  Sustainable development emerged as an alternative objective to economic growth during the 
1980s.  In 1987 the United Nations published Our Common Future, also known as The 
Brundtland Report, and defined sustainable development as, “development that meets the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”  
The ideas of sustainability had originally emerged out of ecological economics and the idea that 
humans (mainly in the developed world) are exceeding the carrying capacity of earth’s resources 
and have a moral obligation to future generations to protect the natural resources for them.  
Given this context, sustainable development explores the interaction of economic, social and 
environmental goals. 
  Underlying sustainable development is the theory of sustainability.  The theory of sustainability 
argues that it is the responsibility of the current generation to maintain the capital stocks of the 
world to ensure that future generations are provided the same potential for well-being as today’s 
population. Theorists are divided on whether it is necessary to leave the same types of capital or 
if types of capital are interchangeable for ensuring future potential.  Daly (1996) and others 
believe that human capital and natural capital are not interchangeable, a theory termed strong 
sustainability. Solow and Hartwick, on the other hand, argue that if the rents resulting from the 
extraction and production of natural capital, and in particular exhaustible natural capital, are 
invested in human capital sustainability is still possible (Hamilton 1995).   
  Many empirical frameworks for sustainable development emerged in the literature. In general, 
the frameworks list a set of development goals focusing on sources of wealth, indexes for 
measuring progress towards those goals, and models of how flows through the economy impact a 
source of wealth.  Wealth in the context of sustainable development is more widely defined than 
economic wealth and in its’ widest definition includes the following types of capital: natural, 
physical, financial, human, social, intellectual, cultural, and political (Pender et al. 2014).  
Another classification consists of natural, social, human, and built capital assets (Costanza et al. 
2016). 
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  Some of the frameworks are more focused on developing countries (Costanza et al 2016), while 
others examine urban sustainability (Prakash et al. 2016).  A conceptual framework for rural 
sustainable development, specifically for the US, has been created by Pender, Weber, and Brown 
(2104). 
  The conceptual framework for US rural sustainable development devised by Pender, Weber, 
and Brown (2014) focuses on wealth creation through outcomes that are the result of decisions 
made by local actors within the economic, institutional, and policy context.  Decisions include 
livelihood strategies, investments, production, and consumption. Local actors include individuals 
and households, businesses, civil society organizations, and local governments.  The economic, 
institutional, policy context consists of markets and technology, laws and regulations, policies 
and programs, natural phenomena, and conflict or war.  The context impacts the wealth of local 
actors, who constitutes local actors, and outcomes.  At the same time, the context is impacted by 
decisions of local actors.  The outcomes of the actors’ decisions, which then impact community 
wealth, can be economic, environmental, or social. 
  Using this framework (depicted in Figure 4), I consider how decisions made by local 
government as local actors, between consumption and investments alter future outcomes.  
Theoretically, from the weak sustainability point of view if local governments invest in other 
types of capital this should improve a community’s ability to sustain the pace of development 
after the boom.  To test this theory, public welfare spending can be considered current 
consumption, while spending on education, highways, and health and hospitals can be 
considered investment into future welfare potential.  Communities that spend more on future 
welfare should display higher outcomes during the bust period than communities that spend 
more on current welfare.   
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Figure 4: General wealth-decisions-outcomes framework (Pender et al. 2012) 
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Chapter 4: Data and descriptive statistics 
 
  The data for analysis are from two sources.  Data on local government revenues and 
expenditures are from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research in The 
Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: The United States, 1790-2002 (ICPSR 
2896) by Michael Haines.  Data on boom counties and outcome variables are from a dataset 
created by Jacobsen and Parker (2016).  The data they utilize includes variables for boom status 
derived from iHS1 proprietary data and economic variables from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis.  Details of specific variables are described in the following sections based on their role 
in the analysis. 
Time period and units of observation 
  The rise and fall of oil prices is one of the main causes of booms and they have been occurring 
in the US since the middle 1800s.  El-Ramly (2014) describes the cyclical nature of the oil 
industry by defining cycles in the United States since 1859.  Each of these periods as shown in 
Figure 5 represents periods when the price of oil increased followed by decreases of more than 
30% in accumulated average price.  These cycles provide opportunities for research before, 
during, and after an oil and gas boom.  The period from 1974-1994 (the 5th period on the chart) 
was preceded by relatively stable prices, has a large increase in price for a relatively short period 
of time, and is followed by a brief period of stable prices before the next cycle began – making it 
ideal for studying the impact of a boom on the rural counties that were affected.  
                                                 
1 You can visit the company website, iHS.com, for further information. 
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Figure 5: Oil and gas cycles, 1859-2012 (El-Ramly 2014) 
 
  The time period of this empirical study is 1967-1998, a thirty-two year period that includes the 
stable period before and after the 1974-1981 boom.  This period provides a useful study period 
for two other reasons.  First, there were no new large discoveries of oil and gas in the Rocky 
Mountains during this period.  And second, data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis is based 
on industry classifications codes. These codes changed in 2001.  The ability to confine the 
analysis to before this change means I do not have to worry about data inconsistencies. 
   For purposes of analysis the cycle is broken into the following periods: 
• 1967-1974 (pre-boom) 
• 1975-1979 ( EB - early boom) 
• 1980-1981 (PB - peak boom) 
• 1982-1985 (LB - late boom) 
• 1986-1998 (BUST – bust and post bust)   
The periods are based on increases in both prices and drilling and are consistent with the periods 
utilized by Jacobsen and Parker (2016) to analyze the impact of phases of the boom on income 
and employment in the same region.  They utilized propriety drilling data  for the region and 
compared increases in prices to increases in drilling.  During the early phases of the boom 
employment and population begins to increase.  During the peak phase both prices and drilling 
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are at their highest point.  The late-boom  phase is defined by the slowing down of drilling and 
the beginning of the drop in prices.  Finally the bust and pot-bust phase begins when prices reach 
their lowest price and begin to level out again. 
  
  The units of observation are 356, of 391, counties in the 10 Rocky Mountain States: Arizona, 
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and 
Wyoming. In order to focus on rural sustainable development 35 counties that are classified as 
medium or large by the National Center for Health Statistics are excluded from the analysis.  
Also, two counties were formed during the analysis period, Lapaz, AZ in 1983 and Cibola, NM 
in 1981.  These two counties and the counties whose borders they we formed within, Yuma, AZ 
and Valencia, NM are excluded from the analysis.   
Boom data  
  Boom county data is from Jacobsen and Parker (2016).  They use the number of wells drilled 
from iHS to identify counties in which 100, 200, and 300 extra wells per year were drilled during 
the boom period.  Their process identifies oil and gas boom counties using a difference in 
differences approach, where they calculate the number of wells that would have been drilled had 
there not been a boom and then compare this to the number drilled.       
  The process used to determine if a county is a boom county is to first calculate the linear 
relationship without the boom between the number of wells drilled and time using the number of 
wells drilled each year during the period before and after the boom.  Equation 1 is used to 
calculate δ, the parameter used to estimate additional wells drilled given one more year.  The 
data from 1969-1974 is used for the pre-boom period and 1986-1998 is used for the post-boom 
era.  The boom period from 1975-1985 is omitted from this equation, as the purpose is to 
determine the number of wells that would have been drilled had the boom not occurred.   
(1)                  𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿𝑦𝑦𝑊𝑊𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
  In this equation i indexes the county and t indexes the year.  The parameter and the predicted 
wells in 1974 are then used in Equation 2 to calculate the estimated number of wells that would 
have been built were there not a boom, the counterfactual wells drilled. 
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(2)    𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑦𝑦𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦𝑊𝑊 𝐷𝐷𝑦𝑦𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 1974𝑖𝑖  × (1 + 𝛿𝛿)𝑖𝑖−1974 
  This counterfactual number of wells is the subtracted from the number of actual new wells 
drilled from 1975 through 1991 to determine the extra wells drilled due to the boom created by 
the increase in oil and gas prices. 
(3)          𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =   𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑦𝑦𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦𝑊𝑊 𝐷𝐷𝑦𝑦𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
  Of the 356 counties in the analysis, 35 had 200 extra wells drilled during the boom period (for 
boom = 200, n = 35).  These are the counties that are used as the boom counties in the main 
analysis.  Of these 35, 20 had 300 extra wells drilled during the peak (for boom = 300, n = 20).  
There were 19 other counties that had 100 extra wells drilled, but did not meet the 200 well 
criteria (for boom = 100, n = 54). 
   
 
Local government expenditures data 
  Local government finance data are obtained from three of Haines’ 106 data sets (DS77, DS78, 
and DS83). Local government expenditure variables are available for 1967, 1972, 1977, 1982, 
1987, 1992, and 1998 and include total revenue, total expenditures, education spending, highway 
spending, health and hospitals spending and public welfare spending.  Total revenue, total 
expenditures and specific spending categories are used as outcome variables in the first part of 
the analysis to test if local governments in boom counties receive and spend more in both 
absolute and per capita during phases of the boom. Because the distributions are skewed toward 
zero for each of the categories, the log of each is used in the econometric model. 
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  Summary statistics are shown in Table 1 for revenue, savings, and spending.  All values are 
nominal values and are not deflated.  The fixed effects methods accounts for changes in real 
terms that all counties experience equally.  The mean revenue during the study period is $17.2 
million dollars, with local government revenue ranging from $0 to over $288 million.  Counties 
tend to spend the majority of the revenues with mean total expenditures equaling $16.7 million 
and approximately 50% of spending is for education.  The means for public welfare and health 
and hospitals spending are the lowest. 
Table 1: Summary statistics for revenue and spending, observations = 2,130 (all values in 
$1,000’s) 
Description Mean Std. dev Min Max 
Local government revenue 17,204 31,027 0 288,072 
Local government revenue per capita 1.17 1.03 0 17.50 
 
Local government expenditures 16,748 30,170 200 313,590 
Local government expenditures per capita 1.13 0.95 0.037 9.81 
 
Local government savings 456 4,158 -48,893 78,770 
Local government savings per capita 0.04 0.27 -1.705 7.66 
 
Education spending 8,332 14,468 0 128,160 
Education spending per capita 0.56 0.41 0 4.64 
 
Public welfare spending 428 1,618 0 37,683 
Public welfare spending per capita 0.03 0.06 0 0.90 
 
Highway spending 1,343 2,091 0 39,441 
Highway spending per capita 0.13 0.14 0 1.89 
 
Health & hospital spending 1,099 3,503 0 65,566 
Health & hospital spending per capita 0.07 0.15 0 1.67 
 
  In the second part of the analysis, significant changes in government spending in education and 
highways are used to represent investment. The change is calculated from 1967 (pre-boom) to 
1982 (peak boom) as an absolute change, a change in per capita investment, and a percentage 
change.   Table 1 shows the mean of each type of spending change.  Education has the highest 
mean for absolute change at over $7 million.  The mean absolute change for health and hospitals 
is approximately the same as for highways at $1.2 million.  Health and hospitals has the highest 
mean for percentage of change at 34%, while each of the other categories is 4%.  A dummy 
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variable is then created to classify counties as high investment counties, using the seventy-fifth 
percentile as the cutoff point.  For each category on average 8 of the 35 boom counties and 20 of 
the 284 non-boom counties are classified as high investment. 
Table 2: Summary statistics for spending changes from 1967-1982 and high investment dummy 
variables, observations = 356 
 Variable  Mean Std. dev Min Max 
Change in absolute spending from 1967-1982 ($1,000’s) 
Change in absolute education spending 7,486 10,231 -286 58,831 
Change in absolute highway spending 1,189 1,495 -241 14,342 
Change in absolute health &  hospital spending 1,158 3,301 -1,499 37,070 
Change in absolute public welfare spending 282 1,161 -1,216 17,115 
 
Dummy variable for high absolute spending change 
Education spending 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Highway spending 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Health &  hospital spending 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Public welfare spending 0.23 0.42 0 1 
 
Per capita spending changes from 1967-1982 ($1,000’s) 
Change in per capita education spending  0.45 0.21 -0.16 1.80 
Change in per capita highway spending 0.10 0.11 -0.035 1.30 
Change in per capita health &  hospital spending 0.07 0.11 -0.049 0.58 
Change in per capita public welfare spending 0.01 0.03 -0.061 0.23 
 
Dummy variable for high per capita spending changes 
High per capita education spending change 0.08 0.27 0 1 
High per capita highway spending change 0.12 0.33 0 1 
High per capita health &  hospital spending change 0.13 0.34 0 1 
High per capita public welfare spending change 0.31 0.46 0 1 
 
Outcome variable (observations = 10,680)  
Per capita income 9,023 2,194 2,492 28,458 
 
  Figure 6 shows the counties that are classified into each of the four types of counties based on 
change in per capita spending: boom and high per capita spending change, boom and low per 
capita spending change, non-boom and high per capita spending change, and non-boom and low 
per capita spending change.  High per capita education spending change is concentrated in 
Wyoming, public welfare in North Dakota and Colorado, highway spending change is spread 
across Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and the northeast portion of Wyoming.  High per 
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capita spending changes in health and hospitals is disbursed across Montana, Wyoming, and 
Colorado. 
 
Figure 6: Classifications of counties as boom (green) or non-boom (blue) and high investment 
(dark) in per capita spending 
 
Outcomes data for testing impact of high spending 
  Per capita income is used to test whether increased local government investment during the 
early period of the boom improves outcomes in the late boom and bust period.  
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Figure 7 shows the difference in per capita income for boom versus non-boom counties 
throughout the thirty year period. Both types of counties followed similar paths in the pre-boom 
period satisfying the assumption of the difference in differences method.  The similar pattern 
includes an economy wide boom in the early 1970’s when mean income per capita increased and 
then fell in both boom and non-boom counties. Jacobsen and Parker (2016) found a statistically 
and practically significant positive impact to per capita income in boom counties during the 
early, peak, and late boom periods.  In addition, they found a slightly negative, but still 
significant, negative impact during the bust phase.  It is this result that I am further analyzing to 
determine if local government investment early in the boom phase mitigates these negative 
impacts.   
  
Figure 7: Comparison of means for ln(income per capita) for boom (dash) and non-boom (solid) 
counties.  Blue lines depict phases of the boom, pre-boom(1969-1975), early boom (1975-1979), 
peak boom (1980-1981), late boom (1982-1985) and bust and post bust (1986-1998)  
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Chapter 5: Analytical and empirical model 
 
  The goal of the project is to gain a better understanding of the role local government’s decisions 
can play in sustaining growth after a resource boom.  Accomplishing this is a two-step process.  
First, I assess whether boom counties do in fact experience increases in revenues and 
expenditures relative to non-boom counties as a result of the boom. Second, I analyze how boom 
counties spend the additional revenues and the impact of those choices on outcomes during the 
bust and post-bust periods. Counties are classified as high spending in specific categories: 
education, highways, health and hospitals, or public welfare.       
  During an oil and gas boom employment and personal income increase early in the boom when 
drilling offers high paying jobs (Jacobsen and Parker 2916), but increases in local government 
revenues lag behind by a year or two (Haefele and Morton 2009).  Local governments obtain 
additional revenues during booms primarily from taxes on production at the local, state, and 
federal level. At the local level, counties charge an ad valorem tax on production. States assess a 
severance tax on production and a portion of this is returned to the local area.  Production on 
federal lands is assessed a Federal Mineral Revenue (FMR) tax, a portion of which is returned to 
the state which then distributes a portion back to the local area.  Ad valorem and severance taxes 
generally lag a year behind production and FMR taxes lag two to three years behind production.   
  The early boom period was from 1975-1979, during this period drilling started to accelerate.  
Production is preceded by drilling and completion, further creating a lag between the booms 
effect on incomes and employments and the increase in local revenue.  I would expect to see 
little to no change in the difference between boom and non-boom counties for 1972 and 1977 in 
comparison to 1967.  I do expect to see an increase in government revenues beginning about the 
time of the peak boom in 1979-1981.  The government finance year that corresponds most 
closely to this time period is 1982.  Given the lag with taxes, the increase in comparison to non-
boom counties should continue one or two years into the bust period, therefore the next local 
government reporting period in 1988 should also show a statistically significant positive 
difference in local government revenues between boom counties and non-boom counties relative 
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to the difference between them in the pre-boom period.  This positive difference should diminish 
by the 1992 reporting period.   
  Local government can choose to spend the additional revenues received from oil and gas rents 
or save it.  If they choose to spend it, they can either spend it on current well-being, through 
increasing public welfare spending, or they can invest in future well-being, through increased 
education, highway or health and hospital spending.  Because the communities have experienced 
an influx of population and increased use of public services, I would expect to see expenditures 
increase when revenues increase.     
  Changes in local government spending between 1967 and 1982 represent the choices made by 
local governments on improving current well-being or potential future well-being.  For purposes 
of analysis, increases in public welfare spending are viewed as a choice made by local 
governments to increase current levels of welfare and improve current equitable distribution. An 
increase in the portion of total revenue saved is viewed as investing for future welfare.  Increases 
in spending in education, highways, and health and hospitals are also viewed as investing for 
future welfare. 
  According to theories of weak sustainability, if rents are reinvested into other forms of capital 
booms counties should be able to sustain development.  The theory of weak sustainability argues 
that future potential will be maintained when nonrenewable natural resources are extracted is the 
rents received from extraction are reinvested in human, social, or other types of physical capital.  
Following this logic, communities with higher changes in investment from 1967 and 1982 should 
experience a less severe bust and should have improved outcomes post-bust.  In contrast, those 
counties that increase public welfare spending during the same period will have a more severe 
bust and will have negative outcomes in the post-bust period in comparison.  It is important to 
keep in mind that local governments are not the only decision-makers receiving rents from oil 
and gas extraction.  Federal government, state government, individuals, and businesses are also 
receiving rents and making consumption and investment choices.  Therefore, this current 
analysis studies whether reinvestment of a portion of the rents impacts outcomes during the bust 
and post-bust. 
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  Counties are subset in two ways to analyze whether choices made early in the boom impact 
outcomes in the bust and post-bust periods.  First, counties are subset by boom and non-boom 
and local government investment choices are analyzed.  The boom subgroup consists of the 
thirty five counties with 200 extra wells drilled.  The counties are further classified as high 
investment if there spending change is above the 75th percentile.  There are 7 or 8 counties in this 
subgroup for each type of spending.  When these counties are analyzed I expect to see that 
counties with higher investment, as measured by increases in spending, experience higher mean 
income per capita relative to lower spending counties.   
  Counties are also subset according to their investment levels.  In this analysis boom and non-
boom counties are included in the subgroups, and I analyze whether the phases of the boom 
impact outcomes differently in boom counties.  For the high spending change in education, 
highways, and health and hospitals subgroups, I expect to see outcomes continually improve in 
both groups during periods after 1982.  For the subgroup with high spending changes in public 
welfare, I expect to see little to no improvement to mean income per capita for the periods after 
1982.  This should also be the case for the subgroups with low spending changes in education, 
highways and health and hospitals.  For the subgroup with low spending changes in public 
welfare spending, mean income per capita should remain relatively unchanged. 
  To test whether weak sustainability holds for counties during a boom and bust cycle, I first 
confirm whether boom counties receive a flow of rents from the extraction of oil and gas during 
the boom.  I follow the fixed effects difference in differences methodology developed by 
Jacobsen and Parker (2016).  Using county fixed effects allows me to control for time invariant 
characteristics of counties, such as the amount of land, percentage of public versus private land, 
the state, and the tax policies of the state and county.  Including dummy variables for each year2, 
further allow me to control for the events all counties experience during a specific year.  The 
basic model is Equation 5.     
(5)    log (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +  𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 +  𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  × 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝑊𝑊 𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑦𝑦𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 +  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                                 
2 In each of the regressions every year is included as a dummy variable. The results for these 
dummy variables are not included in the tables. 
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  In this equation the outcome variable, 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of revenue or spending by county, i, for 
every fifth year, t, from 1967-1992. 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is a vector of county-specific effects that account for time 
invariant differences across county, i. 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 is a vector of yearly effects that controls for shocks that 
occur in all counties in year, t. 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an idiosyncratic error term.  The effect of the interaction of 
boom county status with the time period is indicated by the vector of coefficients,  𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖.  This 
interaction term provides information on how the path of the type of county being tested differs 
from other counties during the specific year or time period in relation to pre-boom period.  A key 
assumption of the difference in difference method is that the trend of the outcome variable for 
the two types of counties was similar before the boom. 
  Difference in differences allows the intercepts of the two groups to differ, but requires that the 
trends of the two are similar before the oil and gas boom occurs.  Once the shock occurs, 
difference in differences analyzes how the difference between the two groups changes as a result 
of the boom.  The difference between the means of the two groups prior to the boom is 
calculated as the average difference.  Any change in this average difference during subsequent 
periods is measured by the interaction coefficient, 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖.   
  That the trends of the group are similar prior to the boom is not the only assumption of the 
model.  In addition, it is assumed that there are no other variables or characteristics that change 
within some counties, but not within others, that is also correlated with the increases in the 
outcome variables. 
  In the first part of the analysis, how the boom impacts local government revenues and 
expenditures, the time periods are every five years3 for years corresponding to phases of the 
boom: 
• 1967 – pre-boom 
• 1972  - pre-boom 
• 1977 – early boom (EB) 
• 1982 – peak boom (PB) 
• 1988 – bust (BUST) 
• 1992 – post-bust (BUST) 
                                                 
3 The Census of Governments is conducted every five years. 
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  The first set of outcome variables are the log of per capita revenues, expenditures, and savings 
to confirm that boom counties receive additional revenues and do spend them.  The second set of 
outcome variables explores spending in specific expenditure categories: education, highways, 
health and hospitals, and public welfare.  The log of per capita spending is the focus of the main 
analysis, as it measures investment per person.  The log of total absolute changes and percentage 
increases are included in Appendix D and discussed in the robustness section. 
  To determine how local government choices impact future outcomes dummy variables are 
created to classify counties as high investment in specific categories of education, public welfare, 
highways, and health and hospitals.  The change in spending from 1967-1982 is calculated as a 
change in per capita spending.  Additionally, counties are classified according to the percentage 
of total spending in 1982.  Counties above the 75th percentile are classified as high spending 
change for the specific category.  High absolute changes and high percentage changes are also 
calculated and are presented in Appendix A and discussed in the robustness section.  
  In the final portion of the analysis, counties are subset according to either boom and non-boom 
or high spending and low spending.  These subgroups are then analyzed to determine the impact 
of local government choices on per capita income during the bust and post-bust period.  First, 
counties are subset according to boom or non-boom.  Then the basic equation is used to examine 
outcomes during phases of the boom in counties using Equation 6.  Impact of high investment on 
per capita income is tested to determine if within boom counties the level of investment is 
statistically significant in determining outcomes.  For comparison purposes, the same analysis is 
performed for non-boom counties.   
(6)    log (𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝑦𝑦 𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +  𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷ℎ 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  × 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑦𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 +  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
  The interaction coefficient, 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖, provides information on the effect of high spending changes on 
mean income per capita during the bust and post-bust period, given that a county is a boom 
county.  For example, if they are above the 75th percentile for change in education spending per 
capita, then during the bust and post-bust period the interaction term should be positive and 
statistically significant.  This will indicate that the difference in mean per capita income between 
high and low spending boom counties has increased relative to the pre-boom period.  
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  Counties are then subset by high and low investment in spending categories and the impact of 
being in a boom county is tested using Equation 7.     
(7)    log (𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝑦𝑦 𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +  𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  × 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑦𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
  Subgroups in this section include high spending change and low spending change.  The 
interaction term, 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖, provides details of the effect on mean income per capita of experiencing a 
boom, given that you are at the same spending level.  By separating high and low spending, I am 
able to analyze if counties with high spending changes experience different outcomes, as 
compared to low spending change counties, during the bust and post-bust periods. 
  An annual model of Equation 7 is presented graphically.  The annual model provides greater 
detail on how the difference in means between groups changes from year to year during the 
boom cycle.  This path difference is relative to non-boom counties in the same spending change 
group.     
  A graphical representation of the mean per capita income from 1969-1998 is created for each of 
the four subgroups: boom with high investment change, boom with low investment change, non-
boom with high investment change, and non-boom with low investment change.  The graphs are 
useful, not only for group comparisons during the boom phases, but also for ensuring that 
counties were on similar trajectories prior to the boom.  This is a necessary assumption for 
difference in difference analysis.      
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Chapter 6: Results 
 
  Results indicate there are increases in the difference of both local government revenue and 
expenditures in boom counties, in comparison to non-boom counties, during the peak and bust 
period.  Specific spending categories also display statistically significant differences as a result 
of the boom.  Whether those differences impact outcomes in the bust and post-bust is not as 
clear.  There are indications of statistical significance with some types of spending; however it is 
difficult to conclusively state it is a result of the boom and the spending of the revenues from the 
boom.     
Total revenue, expenditures and savings 
  Per capita revenues, expenditures and savings increase on a similar path in boom and non-boom 
counties during the pre-boom and early boom period, but appear to diverge during from one 
another during 1982 and 1988.  Figure 8 shows that on average, before the boom period, boom 
counties have more revenue and expenditures per capita but save less.   In the 1982 and 1988 
periods mean per capita revenue and expenditures for boom counties appear to increase at a 
faster rate than the mean for non-boom counties. In the post-boom period of 1992 the difference 
between the means once returns to the pre-boom difference in means. Mean local government 
savings per capita appears to follow a different pattern.  Local government savings in non-boom 
counties appear more volatile. The mean local government savings per capita in non-boom 
counties drops in 1978, but continue to increase in boom counties.  The mean for both types of 
counties increases in 1982, but appears to increase more in boom counties.  The mean drops for 
both in 1988. And then, in 1992 the mean increases for non-boom counties, but drops for boom 
counties.  Finally, the mean for boom counties remains higher than for non-boom counties in 
1992.       
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Figure 8: Mean of per capita revenue, expenditures, and savings for boom and non-boom 
counties from 1967-1992 in $1,000s (dash=boom) 
 
  Regression results show the difference between the mean of boom and non-boom counties for 
revenue, expenditures, and savings remains relatively constant during the pre- and early boom 
periods, diverges during the peak boom period, and then returns to pre-boom differences in 1992.  
The relatively stable differences between the two means in the pre- and early boom are shown by 
the non-significant coefficients for Boom * 1972 and Boom * 1982 in Table 3 and confirm the 
assumption that the two types of counties were on similar paths prior to the boom.  
  The two periods in which I expect to see statistical difference in boom and non-boom counties 
are 1982 and 1987.  Figure 9 and Table 3 provide regression results showing statistically 
significant changes in the difference in means between boom and non-boom counties.  The 
change in the difference of the two means just after the peak boom in 1982 is a 28% increase4 in 
                                                 
4 The coefficient in the model is .25 which is transformed to 28% for interpretation using the 
formula (eb-1)*100 because the regression is a log-linear regression with dummy explanatory 
variables.  This formula is used for transforming all of the coefficients from this point forward. 
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difference for local government revenue per capita, 23% increase for local government 
expenditures per capita, and 16% for local government savings per capita.  The increase in the 
difference of the means for local government revenue per capita and local government 
expenditures per capita is significant at the 1% level and the increase in the difference for local 
government savings per capita is not statistically significant.  In 1987, the change in difference in 
the means has increased further for revenue per capita (31%) and expenditures per capita (26%), 
but has diminished and is no longer statistically different from the pre-boom period for savings 
per capita (12%).  These results imply that local governments do receive revenues from oil and 
gas extraction rents and they do spend them.  
 
Figure 9: Comparison of regression results for impact of boom on local government revenues 
and expenditures. The coefficients represent the difference in means for boom and non-boom 
counties relative to the difference in 1967. 
   I expected local government revenues and expenditures to decrease a few years after the boom 
when revenues from the rents of oil and gas extraction diminish.  While the difference in means 
is still statistically significant at the 10% level for revenue per capita in 1992, the change in 
difference is smaller at 14% for revenue per capita and 12% for expenditures per capita.  These 
results could imply several different ideas.  First, the delay of taxes may be longer than three 
years.  Second, companies may continue production from wells that have already been drilled 
which would lengthen the period of time counties receive rents in the form of taxes.  Lastly, the 
tax base may have increased during the boom.       
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Table 3: Regression results for the impact of the boom on local government revenues per capita, 
expenditures per capita and savings per capita, using year and county fixed effects with robust 
standard errors  
  Revenues Expenditures Savings 
Dependent 
variable 
ln(lg 
revenue) 
ln(lg 
revenue 
per capita 
ln(lg general 
expenditures) 
ln(lg general 
expenditures 
per capita) lg savings 
lg savings 
per capita 
Boom * 1972 -0.028 -0.023 -0.015 -0.010 192.857 -0.003 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (122.27) (0.01) 
       
Boom * 1977 0.092 0.058 0.070 0.036 548.324** 0.025 
 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (200.04) (0.02) 
       
Boom * 1982 0.396*** 0.251*** 0.356*** 0.211** 2022.963 0.148 
 
(0.11) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (2108.64) (0.09) 
       
Boom * 1987 0.370*** 0.269*** 0.331*** 0.230*** 5065.677* 0.111 
 
(0.11) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (2335.98) (0.06) 
       
Boom * 1992 0.180 0.126* 0.168 0.114 1391.144 0.015 
 
(0.10) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (726.09) (0.04) 
       
_cons 7.738*** -1.192*** 7.714*** -1.217*** -16.901 0.007 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (90.51) (0.01) 
       
R2 (within) 0.900 0.938 0.905 0.939 0.029 0.016 
Observations 2129 2129 2130 2130 2130 2130 
F 484.115 1203.688 512.654 1232.347 6.141 7.892 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
Where does the extra spending go? 
  Since results indicate that local governments do receive additional revenues as the result of the 
oil and gas boom, the next step is to determine if their spending choices impact outcomes during 
the bust.  That is, does the theory of weak sustainability hold true.  First, I examine whether 
booms impact local government spending in specific categories: education, public welfare, 
highways, and health and hospitals.  Booms impact education spending per capita and highway 
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spending per capita, but not health and hospital spending per capita. The relationship between 
booms and public welfare spending is not as clear.   
  Figure 10 shows highway spending per capita has the clearest deviation for boom counties 
during the peak and late boom.  Highway spending per capita is lower in boom counties prior to 
the boom and surpasses non-boom in 1982 and increases the difference in 1987.  Boom counties 
spend slightly more on education per capita and health and hospitals per capita, and the boom 
appears to have a small effect of education per capita.  The impact of the boom on health and 
hospitals is not clear in the graph.  While it appears that boom counties spend less on public 
welfare after the boom, the two types of counties do not appear to be on similar paths prior to the 
boom, invalidating the difference in differences approach.    
 
 
Figure 10: Comparison of per capita spending by category in boom and non-boom counties 
(dash=boom) 
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  Regression results, depicted in Figure 11 and Table 4, show that mean highway spending per 
capita and mean education spending per capita both increase significantly for boom counties 
during in 1982 and 1987, while the difference in means between boom and non-boom counties 
for health and hospital spending per capita is relatively stable.  The difference in means for 
highway spending per capita between boom and non-boom counties increases by 55% in 1982 
and 41% in 1987 in relation to the pre-boom period in 1967.  The difference in means in 
education spending per capita also increases - by 14% in 1982 and 21% in 1987.  The difference 
in means for health and hospital spending per capita, on the other hand, diminishes, though not 
significantly.  The lack of significance for health and hospital spending implies that on average 
across all boom counties, the additional revenue received from oil and gas rents by local 
governments is allocated to highways and education5.   
                                                 
5 Public welfare spending appears to decrease in boom counties; however, given the dissimilar 
paths of the two types of counties prior to the boom I cannot draw any conclusions from the 
regressions results. 
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Figure 11: Comparison of regression results for impact of boom on specific spending of local 
governments. The coefficients represent the difference in means for boom and non-boom 
counties relative to the difference in 1967. 
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Table 4: Regression results for the impact of the boom on local government spending on 
education, public welfare, highways, and health and hospitals, 1967-1992, using year and 
countyfixed effects and robust standard errors 
  Education Public welfare Highways Health and hospitals 
Dependent 
Variable 
ln(education 
spending per 
capita 
ln(public welfare 
spending per 
capita) 
ln(highway 
spending per 
capita) 
ln(hospital spending 
per capita) 
Boom * 1972 0.020 -0.446** 0.031 -0.028 
  (0.06) (0.17) (0.06) (0.19) 
     
Boom * 1977 0.046 -1.049** 0.040 0.079 
  (0.06) (0.36) (0.06) (0.25) 
     
Boom * 1982 0.134 -0.457 0.444*** -0.209 
  (0.07) (0.29) (0.11) (0.29) 
     
Boom * 1987 0.192** -0.647 0.338*** -0.172 
  (0.07) (0.42) (0.09) (0.25) 
     
Boom * 1992 0.099 -0.697* 0.176* -0.081 
  (0.07) (0.34) (0.08) (0.30) 
     
_cons -1.812*** -5.156*** -3.334*** -5.578*** 
  (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) 
     
R2 0.884 0.326 0.811 0.459 
Observations 2124 1939 2127 2008 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
 
Does reinvestment of rents improve outcomes in the bust and post-bust periods? 
  Results indicate that revenues and expenditures per capita increase in boom counties in 
comparison to non-boom counties during the peak and late boom, and on average for boom 
counties these increases are spent on education and highways.  Does the extra spending in 
specific categories alter outcomes during the bust?  And, if counties invest differently can they 
improve outcomes during the bust?  The particular outcome tested in the analysis is per capita 
income.  Jacobsen and Parker (2016) found that boom counties were worse off in the post bust 
period in comparison to non-boom counties.  And that, while boom counties started with higher 
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per capita income than non-boom counties, in the post-bust period they had lower per capita 
incomes.  By further examining how counties spend the extra money, is it possible to determine 
the choices that produce these negative outcomes? 
  To answer these questions I classify counties as high or low investment in education, highways, 
public welfare, and health and hospitals in two different ways using the 75th percentile for boom 
counties as the dividing point6.  The first high and low division of counties is based on the 
change in per capita spending from 1967-1982 and the second is based on the percent of total 
spending in 1982 on a particular category.  Counties are then subdivided in two ways.  First, on 
whether they are a boom county to analyze the impact of high spending on outcomes given that 
you are a boom county.  Second, on whether they are a high investment county in a particular 
category to analyze whether a boom impacts high spending counties differently.        
  Figure 12 compares the path of per capita income for each category of spending for each of the 
four types of counties: boom and high spend (orange dashed line), boom and low spend (black 
dashed line), non-boom and high spend (orange solid line), and non-boom and low spend (solid 
black line).  Counties with higher changes in education spending per capita and health and 
hospital spending per capita appear to experience higher income per capita during the post bust 
period, while counties with higher highway spending per capita appear experience lower income 
per capita during the bust and post bust periods.  Interestingly, boom counties with lower higher 
spending changes appear to experience the higher mean income per capita after the boom, 
relative to high highway spending per capita change boom counties. 
  The graphs also provide information on which subgroups were on the same paths prior to the 
pre-boom period in 1974 and the spending change in 1982, which is necessary for difference in 
differences analysis.  For the education spending groups, the two boom counties (dashed lines) 
appear to follow similar paths just before the pre-boom period, diverge shortly after, and then 
appear to follow similar paths for a few years before 1982.  The two non-boom counties (solid 
lines) appear to diverge prior to 1982 with mean income per capita dropping further for the low 
                                                 
6 I analyze public welfare and health and hospitals even though there were not significant pattern 
differences in spending for boom and non-boom counties, because there may still be counties 
that spent more in these areas and that spending choice may make a significant difference on 
outcomes during the bust period. 
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spending change group.  The two high spending change subgroups (orange lines) also appear to 
follow similar paths before each cut-off, as do the two low spending subgroups (black lines). 
  Within the highway spending groups, the boom subgroups (dashed lines) do not appear to be on 
similar paths prior to 1974 or 1982.  The non-boom subgroups (solid lines) are also on dissimilar 
paths prior to the cut-off dates.  The high spending change subgroups (orange lines) and the low 
spending change subgroups (black lines) each seem to be on similar paths within their group.         
 
Figure 12: Comparison of paths of per capita income for boom (dashed lines) and high changes 
in per capita spending (orange lines) 
  For health and hospitals, boom counties (dashed lines) were not on similar paths prior to either 
cut-off and non-boom counties (solid lines) were also on dissimilar paths.  The high spending 
subgroups (orange lines) do appear to follow similar paths in the years just before 1974 and 
1982, while the low spending subgroups (black lines) also seem to follow similar paths in the 
years just before the cutoffs. 
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  There is an important distinction between the education and highway spending groups and the 
public welfare and health and hospital groups of counties.  High and low spending boom 
counties for education and highways appear to begin at the same initial per capita level, while 
high public welfare and health and hospital spending boom counties have higher initial levels of 
per capita income.  This higher level of per capita income may be the cause of their ability to 
spend more on health and hospitals or the need to spend more on per capita income.  See Chapter 
7: Robustness and Limitations for a discussion of the impact of initial conditions.     
  Regression results indicate that given you are in a boom county, high and low per capita 
spending changes does not impact the difference in means for the bust and post-bust period 
(Table 5); however, given that you are a low per capita spending change county, the boom will 
negatively impact outcomes during the post-bust period (Table 6). This result for the boom 
county subgroups is contradictory to what I expected prior to the analysis.  Theoretically, within 
a boom county if you invest in other types of capital by spending more on education, highways 
and health and hospitals outcomes during the post bust should be statistically more.  The limited 
sample size may have hindered this portion of the analysis.  This and other limitations are 
addressed in Chapter 7. 
  While almost all boom counties appear worse off after the boom, those that have lower 
spending changes experience more drastic declines.  This may indicate that spending doesn’t 
lead to positive outcomes for per capita income, but can help counties avoid very bad outcomes.  
The difference in means between boom and non-boom counties during the bust has fallen by 
about 8% for low education and low health and hospital spending counties.   
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Table 5: Impact of high per capita changes in spending (indicated by the interaction term) on ln(income per capita), using year and 
county fixed effects with robust standard errors  
  Boom Non-boom 
Interaction dummy variable  
High per capita spending change in  High per capita spending change in 
Education Highways Hospitals Public Welfare Education Highways Hospitals Public Welfare 
Dependent variable  ln(per capita income) ln(per capita income) 
Interaction variable * EB 0.068 -0.066 0.090 -0.040 0.049* -0.020 -0.032 0.012 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
         
Interaction variable * PB 0.062 0.003 0.113 -0.025 0.128*** -0.004 0.031 -0.020 
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
         
Interaction variable * LB 0.083 -0.001 0.076 0.013 0.023 0.068 0.006 0.038* 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
        
Interaction variable * BUST 0.052 -0.087 0.085 -0.053 -0.027 0.022 -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
         
_cons 8.908*** 8.908*** 8.908*** 8.908*** 8.844*** 8.844*** 8.844*** 8.844*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
         
R2 (within) 0.341 0.349 0.346 0.340 0.405 0.403 0.402 0.402 
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 9600 9600 9600 9600 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance level, respectively. 
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Table 6: Regression results for the impact of the boom on boom counties within high and low spending changes per capita subgroups, 
using year and county fixed effects with robust standard errors 
  Education Highways Health and hospitals Public welfare 
Subgroup  High per capita change 
Low per 
capita change 
High per 
capita change 
Low per 
capita change 
High per 
capita change 
Low per 
capita change 
High per 
capita change 
Low per 
capita change 
Dependent 
variable  ln(income per capita) ln(income per capita) ln(income per capita) ln(income per capita) 
Boom * EB 0.052 0.030 0.011 0.058** 0.144* 0.023 0.008 0.059* 
  (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
         
Boom * PB 0.027 0.089** 0.102 0.097** 0.161* 0.079* 0.093 0.098** 
  (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
         
Boom * LB 0.051 -0.010 -0.049 0.018 0.067 -0.004 -0.006 0.019 
  (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
         
Boom * BUST -0.002 -0.080** -0.150 -0.042* 0.005 -0.082** -0.104 -0.051* 
  (0.05) (0.03) (0.08) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) 
         
_cons 8.889*** 8.849*** 8.929*** 8.841*** 8.945*** 8.838*** 8.828*** 8.863*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
         
R2 (within) 0.341 0.405 0.280 0.440 0.366 0.403 0.403 0.408 
Observations 840 9870 1350 9360 1440 9270 3300 7410 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance level, respectively. 
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Figure 13: Coefficients for fixed effects annual regression with robust standard errors for high 
and low spending groups.  Dependent variable is ln(income per capita) and the interdependent 
variables are boom status interacted with the year.  Coefficients represent the mean difference 
between boom and non-boom counties relative to the difference in 1969. 
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Chapter 7: Robustness and limitations 
 
  Prior to establishing spending choices as a mechanism to improve outcomes in boom counties 
in the bust and post-bust period, a robustness check of the findings and discussion of limitations 
and other possible mechanisms is necessary.  The robustness of findings is based on the 
classification of a county as a boom county, the choice of measurement for spending values, and 
the further classification of counties as high spending change.  Experimenting with alternative 
definitions of each of these classifications will provide assurance that the results are not a 
product of the thresholds chosen. A discussion of other possible mechanisms and limitations of 
the model considers whether the type and level of spending is exogenous. 
   To determine robustness of the impact of the boom on local government revenues and 
spending I tested alternative definitions of a boom county and different measurements of the 
revenue and spending.  For the definition of the boom, the main analysis classifies a county as a 
boom county if there are 200 or more extra wells drilled.  I checked if the results were consistent 
if the boom was defined as 100 extra wells or as 300 extra wells. There are 35 counties classified 
as boom counties when the threshold is 200 extra wells.  When the threshold is lowered to 100 
extra wells there are 54 boom counties, and when it is increased to 300 extra wells there are only 
20.   
  Results for total revenues and expenditures and for each category of spending are available in 
Appendix G and are statistically consistent with the results for 200 extra wells.  The percentage 
of change in the means of the boom and non-boom counties increases as the threshold of extra 
wells increases.  When the threshold is 300 extra wells the difference in means for revenue per 
capita between boom and non-boom increases by 43% in both 1982 and 1987, as opposed to the 
23% and 26% increases when the threshold is 200 extra wells.   This indicates that the number of 
extra wells in a county does impact local government revenue and expenditures.    
  The results for spending on specific categories indicates that on average counties experiencing 
higher level of booms spend more of the additional funds on highways and less on education, 
while the per capita spending change is insignificant in all cases for public welfare and health 
and hospitals. The results imply that the relationship between level of the boom and spending 
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choices, particularly for choices regarding education spending, are only somewhat consistent 
with the main model.  Table 7 shows that percentage change in means for education spending per 
capita for 1982 is lowest at 14% when the boom level threshold is 200 extra wells and highest at 
31% when the boom level threshold is only 100.  These results indicate low-level boom counties 
increase both education and high spending equally, for some reason  mid-level boom counties 
need to increase highway spending more, and high-level boom  counties are able to increase 
education spending after a certain threshold of highway spending has been reached.  Highway 
spending per capita, on the other hand, follows the pattern of revenues and total expenditures, 
with the increasing differences in means as the threshold of extra wells is raised.  These results 
imply the relationship between the level of the boom and education spending per capita change is 
not a linear relationship, but should not impact the analysis of whether increases in education 
spending per capita effect outcomes during the bust. 
Table 7: Comparison of coefficients for education and highways for all three levels of boom, 
1982 and 1987 
  Education Highways 
Dependent variable  ln(education spending per capita) ln(highway spending per capita) 
Boom level 100 200 300 100 200 300 
Boom * 1982 0.271 0.134 0.184 0.289 0.444 0.584 
Boom * 1987 0.296 0.192 0.234 0.250 0.338 0.425 
  
  The second set of robustness checks focus on the choice of per capita, versus absolute or 
percentage of total, spending when determining if booms impact spending.  I used per capita 
measures in the main analysis because populations in boom counties increased during the boom 
period and fell in the post bust period, while populations in the non-boom counties remained 
relatively constant throughout (Jacobsen & Parker 2016).  The influx of additional people 
requires additional expenditures per person for services such as education and also increases 
revenues from sources such as sales tax.  The use of per capita measures helps to isolate 
additional revenue from oil and gas rents. Appendix D shows the percentage increase in mean in 
1982 and 1987 for total revenues and expenditures is over 11% higher than the increase in mean 
for per capita revenue and expenditures. The same is true for education spending and highway 
spending.  For the most part, the change in percentage is insignificant for education spending and 
highway spending.  This is not surprising, since as revenues and expenditures increase, the 
percentage spent in each category will not necessarily change.  The exception is public welfare 
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spending, while per capita and total public welfare spending is insignificant in 1982 and 1987, 
the coefficient for percentage spent is negative and significant with a 99% decrease in 1982 and a 
141% decrease in 1987. 
  I analyze the choice of using change in per capita spending, rather than absolute or percentage 
changes, to determine high spending by using the graphical annual model.  Maps in Appendix C 
show that using different measurements to classify high spending changes the counties included 
as high spending change are different. Graphs for each model are in Appendix E and show only 
small differences among measurement methods for non-boom counties, but insightful patterns 
for boom counties.  The graphs for highway spending changes show that using the change in 
absolute spending to classify counties results in high spending counties have higher per capita 
income in the post-bust period, while the per capita change in spending model shows high 
spending boom counties with lower per capita income than any other counties. 
  The different results for per capita income when using absolute and per capita changes in 
spending imply that the counties classified into each group are much different.  The group with 
high highway absolute spending changes may be those with large population changes, while 
those with high highway per capita spending changes are perhaps those with low population 
changes.  Consequently, the groups of counties classified as high spending is substantially 
different and this alters the results of the analysis.  The highway spending per capita changes in 
the main analysis are the most appropriate because per capita spending changes capture the 
impact of serving a larger population base. This is particularly important if the population has 
grown for reasons other than the oil and gas boom.   
  Lastly, I checked the robustness of the choice of 75th percentile for determining high spending 
change.  When using the 75th percentile there are only 8 or 9 boom counties classified as high 
spending change.  When the threshold is lowered to the 50th percentile there are 17-19 counties 
classified as high spending change.  Examination of the graphs for the annual model show the 
four groups following relatively similar paths using each threshold, but ending up closer together 
during the post bust period.   
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  My analysis has shown that there are correlations between high spending in specific categories 
and per capita income outcomes in the bust; whether these local government choices are a 
mechanism for improving outcomes is not yet clear for several reasons.  First, counties receive 
just a portion of the oil and gas extraction rents and it is usually less than 10%.  For example, 
Wyoming has one of the largest effective tax rates (state severance and local property tax 
combined) on production at 11.7% (Headwaters Economics 2014) and only a portion of the state 
severance tax is returned to the local community.  The other 90% or more of the rents are 
distributed amongst individuals, businesses, state governments, and the federal government.  
Each of these entities is also making choices between spending for current well-being and 
investing for future well-being.  In almost all cases, these other entities are receiving rents earlier 
in the cycle than local counties.  The mechanisms driving the change in per capita income for 
high versus low spending groups could be related to decisions in the private sector. 
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Figure 14: Comparison on 75th percentile (left) and 50th percentile (right) for high per capita 
change in highway spending on per capita income (dash=boom, orange=high spend change) 
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  Another limitation of the findings is that alternative explanations exist.  One alternative 
explanation for my findings is that the social and environmental effects of the boom may be 
dictating spending choices.  Counties may be forced to spend more on highways to mitigate the 
damage done by the boom or simply to create roads for access to wells. So, rather than investing 
in improvements to increase future well-being, the spending is bringing communities back to the 
same level, or to a lower level, than before the boom.  This implies high spending is sheltering 
counties for worse outcome, but not improving opportunities for potential future well-being. 
  Finally, there may be ways in which counties who chose to spend more are different from other 
counties and these differences may change over time.  If this is the case, the model will suffer 
from omitted variable bias.  Robustness checks already suggest correlation with the size of the 
boom and type of spending with outcomes.  In each of the high spending groups the majority of 
the counties had 300 extra wells drilled.  The higher level of the boom, rather than change in 
government spending, may be the cause of the change in means during the post bust.  
  There are likely other differences that change over time and are correlated.  Industries may be 
changing within some counties, but not others.  Some communities chose to focus their growth 
strategy on the retirement aged populations and grew their communities.  Others became 
distributions centers.  The overall recession in the economy, that occurred during the same time 
as the peak boom may have impacted communities differently.  These omitted variables imply 
that the mean income per capita for subgroups is biased upwards is counties within the group 
experienced growth in other industries, or biased downwards if counties within the subgroups 
experienced the recession more deeply than others.  If all groups are equally biased one direction 
or the other than the results of the analysis remain valid.  If one particular subgroup experiences 
these biases then the interaction coefficient is biased in the same direction. 
  Differences in spending may also be a function of initial conditions and different state and local 
strategies that can change over time.  Of the 9 boom counties that are classified as high education 
spending per capita change, 7 are located in Wyoming.  In contrast, Wyoming does not have any 
boom counties classified as high public welfare spending per capita change.  All of the boom 
counties classified as high public welfare spending per capita change are located in either 
Colorado or North Dakota.  Of the 5 boom counties located in New Mexico and Utah, none are 
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classified as high spending per capita change in any category even though 4 of them have more 
than 300 extra wells. To completely isolate the impact of changes in local government spending 
on outcomes during the bust, it is necessary to understand and control for spending of state and 
federal funds during the same period.  For example, state funding may provide funds for capital 
or highway projects in some counties, like Wyoming, allowing local government to concentrate 
additional funds on education.  This would bias the estimator upwards, as the model is failing to 
capture the impact of the state funded projects. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
  Oil and gas booms have been instrumental in shaping the communities in the Rocky Mountains 
for many decades.  It is questionable whether these events provide more benefits than costs.  
Research on natural resources and boom cycles have focused on outcomes before, during, and 
after.  Little to no research has focused on how decisions made during the early and peak boom 
impact outcomes in the bust and post bust period.  My analysis finds local governments in boom 
counties do receive additional revenues as a result of the boom and they do spend these 
additional revenues in education and highways.  Highway spending rises earlier in the cycle and 
education spending rises later.  High additional spending in education appears to shield counties 
for declines in income per capita during the post-bust period.  High additional highway spending 
is related to lower income per capita levels in the post-bust period.  Research on how decisions 
impact and can improve outcomes in the bust can contribute to the academic literature and can 
help inform local government officials. 
  My research can help inform the academic literature by moving the debate beyond whether 
resource abundance accelerates or hinders growth, more to explorations of how utilization of 
rents from booms alters the growth process afterwards. Other studies have explored mechanisms 
which alter outcomes within other industries or geographic areas, but these studies have focused 
on market phenomena rather than individual choice. Does re-investment of rents into other forms 
of capital allow counties (or countries) to sustain growth after the boom?  There is more to be 
gained by framing future research questions in this manner because results can be useful for 
natural resource economies. 
  Rural communities will be able to use this and subsequent research to create and pursue 
strategic develop plans.  My research can be used by policymakers to argue for mitigation funds, 
from oil and gas companies, or higher levels of government spending, to be applied towards 
highway repair and maintenance. Subsequently, allowing them to use rents from oil and gas to 
invest in other types of capital that will improve future outcomes.       
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  Using the theory of weak sustainability and a framework for community economic development 
for the rural United States, this study explores the role of local governments’ reinvestment of 
rents from oil and gas as a method to improve future outcomes.  Spending of additional revenues 
on education, highways, and health and hospitals are used as measures of reinvestment of rents.  
Spending on public welfare is considered current consumption.  Before testing whether 
reinvestment of rents improves outcomes, it was necessary to test whether local government 
revenues and spending increased significantly more in boom, than in non-boom counties.  
Results indicate that boom counties do receive revenues as a result of the oil and gas boom and 
they do spend more as a result.  The per capita revenue and expenditures increased most 
significantly, in comparison to the pre-boom period, in 1982.  This finding shows that there is a 
lag between the time that individuals and businesses receive rents from the oil and gas extraction 
and the time that local governments do.  
  I find that once local governments receive additional revenues, savings increase as does 
spending in education and highways.  Spending for education and highways increase the most in 
absolute and per capita terms; while, public welfare spending increases the most when measured 
as percentage of total spending.  Spending in health and hospitals is not influenced by additional 
revenues.  Useful insights are gleamed from the increases in spending in education and 
highways, but it is more difficult to attribute the oil and gas boom to changes in public welfare 
spending, because the pattern of public welfare spending for boom and non-boom counties were 
not on similar paths prior to the boom.  This violates the assumption of the difference in 
differences method. 
  Large increases in per capita spending for education and highways have opposite effects.  
Boom counties that increase highway spending per capita more appear to experience lower levels 
of per capita income during the boom and post-boom period, while all other boom counties 
experience the highest mean in per capita income. In contrast, boom counties that increase 
education spending per capita more appear to fare better with higher per capita incomes during 
the bust and post-bust period. These results for high levels of highway spending may indicate 
that increases in drilling in the early and peak boom create such damage to highways that 
counties are forced to spend the extra funds making repairs rather than investing in future 
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welfare and once they reach the higher threshold of 300 extra wells they are able to divert funds 
to other purposes. 
  The main question of the study was whether local governments can reinvest rents from oil and 
gas extraction to sustain growth afterwards.  If it is assumed that the extra revenues received in 
boom counties are reinvested in human capital (through education spending) and physical capital 
(through highways and health and education), then this study shows that reinvestment into 
human capital through education is more effective than reinvestment in physical capital.  
However, the difficulty of separating spending into investment and current operations makes the 
results inconclusive.  Also, isolation of the impact of local government spending on per capita 
income levels is difficult.  There may still be characteristics of counties with high spending 
levels that influence per capita income outcomes that were not controlled for in the model.  
Additional research is needed to overcome these limitations.  
  Ideas for future studies include a more in depth examination of types of spending, exploration 
of initial conditions in boom counties, and methods of exploring the impact of early and peak 
boom investment and consumption choices made by individuals and businesses.  A more in-
depth examination of types of spending would further classify increased spending by capital 
projects, maintenance, and current services.  For example, spending in education may be for 
building new facilities, maintaining current facilities in the face of additional pressures, or hiring 
additional teachers and administrators.  New facilities and additional or more highly qualified 
teachers would be considered investments to increase potential future well-being, while 
maintaining current facilities and hiring additional administration to deal with the influx of 
students would be considered consumption or increases in current well-being. 
  With thirty five boom counties in the region case studies exploring cultural and environmental 
capital before, during, and after the boom would provide more information on choices and 
sustainable development.  Many rural communities in the west have distinct cultures based on 
the resources that were an impetus to growth. Some counties have experienced previous boom 
and bust cycles and there may be a learning curve. Also, some counties may have more detailed 
and focused strategic growth plans in place prior to the boom.  Information on each of these 
elements would improve the level of insights gained from my own analysis.   
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  Lastly, additional empirical analysis on how the reinvestment of all rents would further the 
theoretical knowledge about weak sustainability and would provide more insights for local 
policy makers.  Local governments receive only a portion of the rents from the extraction of oil 
and gas.  The federal government, state governments, businesses, and individuals also receive 
rents.  Each of these entities also makes choices about spending for current consumption or 
investing for potential future consumption.  Without analyzing decisions of all to determine how 
much is reinvested for future potential, it is difficult to fully test the concept of weak 
sustainability.  None the less, studying local government revenues in the Rocky Mountain 
provides valuable information on the extent to which their decisions can impact outcomes.  Rural 
county governments provide education, recreational, and hospital facilities that make an area 
attractive to live and work.    
53 
 
References 
 
American Oil and Gas Historical Society. “First North Dakota Oil Well.” Accessed: 5/8/2017. 
doi:http://aoghs.org/petroleumpioneers/northdakotawillistonbasin/. 
Brown, Jason P. 2015. “The Response of Employment to Changes in Oil and Gas Exploration 
and Drilling.” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City: Economic Review, Second Quarter 
2015. 
Brown, Jason P., John Pender, Ryan Wiser, Eric Lantz, and Ben Hoen. 2012. "Ex Post Analysis 
of Economic Impacts from Wind Power Development in U.S. Counties." Energy 
Economics 34 (6): 1743-1754. 
doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2012.07.010. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1112787500. 
Brown, Ralph B., Shawn F. Dorins, and Richard S. Krannich. 2005. "The Boom‐Bust‐
Recovery Cycle: Dynamics of Change in Community Satisfaction and Social Integration 
in Delta, Utah." Rural Sociology 70 (1): 28-49. 
doi:10.1526/0036011053294673. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1526/0036011053
294673/abstract. 
Clay, Karen and Margarita Portnykh. 2016. “When Are Resources Curses and Blessings? 
Evidence From the United States 1880-2012.” Working paper. 
doi:https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2017/preliminary/paper/i8n7F6az 
 
Colorado Oil and Gas Association. 2012. “History of the second oldest oil field in the United 
States: Florence, Colorado.” Denver, Colorado. doi: https://www.coga.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/History-of-Florence-Field.pdf 
Costanza, Robert, Lew Daly, Lorenzo Fioramonti, Enrico Giovannini, Ida Kubiszewski, Lars 
Fogh Mortensen, Kate E. Pickett, Kristin Vala Ragnarsdottir, Roberto De Vogli, and 
Richard Wilkinson. 2016. “Modelling and measuring sustainable well-being in 
connection with the UN Sustainable Deveopment Goals.” Ecological Economics 130 
(2016) 350-355. 
Daly, Herman. 1996. Beyond Growth: The Economics of Sustainable Development. Boston, 
Massachusetts: Beacon Press. 
Dubé, Jean and Mario Polèse. 2015. "Resource Curse and Regional Development: Does Dutch 
Disease Apply to Local Economies? Evidence from Canada." Growth and Change 46 (1): 
38-57. 
doi:10.1111/grow.12064. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/grow.12064/abstract 
 
 
54 
 
Fleming, David A., Thomas G. Measham, and Dusan Paredes. 2015. "Understanding the 
Resource Curse (Or Blessing) Across National and Regional Scales: Theory, Empirical 
Challenges and an Application." Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics 59 (4): 624-639. doi:10.1111/1467-
8489.12118. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8489.12118/abstract. 
Haggerty, Julia, Patricia H. Gude, Mark Delorey, and Ray Rasker. 2014. “Long-term effects of 
income specialization in oil and gas extraction: The U.S. West, 1980-2011.” Energy 
Economics 45 (2016) 186-195. 
Hamilton, Kirk. 1995. "Sustainable Development, the Hartwick Rule and Optimal 
Growth." Environmental and Resource Economics 5 (4): 393-411. 
doi:10.1007/BF00691576. http://econpapers.repec.org/article/kapenreec/v_3a5_3ay_3a19
95_3ai_3a4_3ap_3a393-411.htm. 
Headwaters Economics. 2017. “Why the Rural West Matters.”  April 2017. Bozeman, MT. 
doi:https://headwaterseconomics.org/economic-development/trends-performance/rural-
west-matters/ 
Headwaters Economics. 2014a. “How States Return Revenue to Local Governments from 
Unconventional Oil Extraction: Windfall or Missed Opportunity?” Bozeman, MT. 
doi:http://headwaterseconomics.org/energy/state-energy-policies. 
Headwaters Economics. 2014b. “How Wyoming Returns ‘Unconventional’ Oil Revenue to 
Local Governments.” Updated January 2014. Bozeman, MT. 
doi:http://headwaterseconomics.org/energy/state-energy-policies. 
El-Ramy, Aiman. 2014. “The seven ages of oil: Boom and bust, war and peace, growth and 
decline.” Penn Energy, February 4, 2015. doi: 
http://www.pennenergy.com/articles/pennenergy/2015/02/the-seven-ages-of-oil-boom-
and-bust-war-and-peace-growth-and-decline.html 
Jacobsen, Grant D. and Dominic P. Parker. 2016. "The Economic Aftermath of Resource 
Booms: Evidence from Boomtowns in the American West." The Economic Journal 126 
(593): 1092-1128. 
doi:10.1111/ecoj.12173. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecoj.12173/abstract. 
Keller, John W. 2000. “The Future of Rural America 2000 2050: Conditions, Trends, and 
Issues.” Power point notes for the First National Conference on the Future of Australia’s 
Country Towns. 
doi:http://www.regional.org.au/au/countrytowns/keynote/keller_notes.htm#TopOfPage. 
Limerick, Patricia Nelson, William Travis, and Tamar Scoggin. 2002. “Workshop Report: Boom 
and Bust in the American West.” Center of the American West at the University of 
Colorado at Boulder. 
55 
 
Haefele, Michelle and Pete Morton. 2009. “The Influence of the Pace and Scale of Energy 
Development on Communities: Lessons from the Natural Gas Drilling Boom in the 
Rocky Mountains.” Western Economics Forum, Fall 2009. 
Michaels, Guy. 2011.  "The Long Term Consequences of Resource‐Based Specialisation." The 
Economic Journal 121.551 (2011): 31-57. 
O'Rourke, Dara and Sarah Connolly. 2003. "Just Oil? The Distribution of Environmental and 
Social Impacts of Oil Production and Consumption." Annual Review of Environment and 
Resources 28 (1): 587-617. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.energy.28.050302.105617. http://search.proquest.com/docview/219
851229. 
Pender, John L., Jeremy G. Weber, and Jason P. Brown. 2014. "Sustainable Rural Development 
and Wealth Creation." Economic Development Quarterly 28 (1): 73-86. 
doi:10.1177/0891242413513327. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/08912424
13513327. 
Pender, John, Alexander Marré, and Richard Reeder. 2012. "Rural Wealth Creation." American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 94 (2): 535-
541. http://www.econis.eu/PPNSET?PPN=686771265. 
Power, Thomas Michael.1996. Lost Landscapes and Failed Economies: The Search for a Value 
of Place. Island Press, Washington D.C.  
Prakash, Mihir, Katerina Teksoz, Jessica Espey, and Jeffrey D. Sachs. 2016. "Preliminary US 
Cities Sustainable Development Goals Index.".  SDSN Working Paper. 
doi:http://unsdsn.org/resources/publications/us-cities-sdg-index-consultation/ 
Puga, Diego. 2010. “The Magnitude and Causes of Agglomeration Economies.” Journal of 
Regional Science, Vol. 50, No.1, pp203-219.  
Raimi, Daniel and Richard G. Newell. 2016. "Local Fiscal Effects of Oil and Gas Development 
in Eight States."Duke Energy Institute.  
doi:https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/handle/10161/12391. 
Ricardo, David. 1911. On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. 1992 edition, 
Rutland, Virginia: Charles E. Tuttle Co,, Inc. 
Roberts, Phil. “The Oil Business in Wyoming.” Wyohistory.org: A Project of the Wyoming State 
Historical Society.  Accessed: 5/8/2017. 
doi:http://www.wyohistory.org/encyclopedia/oilbusinesswyoming. 
 
56 
 
Sachs, Jeffrey, and Andrew Warner.1997. “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic 
Growth.” Revised version. Unpublished manuscript. Harvard Institute for International 
Development.  doi: 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7b14/045909f42117197b82a910782ab68330a3e7.pdf 
Smith, Adam. 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 1976 
edition, Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press. 
Van der Ploeg, Frederick. 2011.  "Natural resources: Curse or blessing?" Journal of Economic 
Literature 49.2 (2011): 366-420. 
Van Der Ploeg, Frederick and Steven Poelhekke. 2017. "The Impact of Natural Resources: 
Survey of Recent Quantitative Evidence." The Journal of Development Studies 53 (2): 
205-216. 
doi:10.1080/00220388.2016.1160069. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0022
0388.2016.1160069. 
Venables, Anthony J. 2016. "Using Natural Resources for Development: Why has it Proven so 
Difficult?" Journal of Economic Perspectives 30 (1): 161-184. 
doi:10.1257/jep.30.1.161. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1762035370. 
Weber, Jeremy G. 2012. "The effects of a natural gas boom on employment and income in 
Colorado, Texas, and Wyoming." Energy Economics 34.5 (2012): 1580-1588. 
Weber, Jeremy G. 2014.  "A decade of natural gas development: The makings of a resource 
curse?" Resource and Energy Economics 37 (2014): 168-183. 
doi:http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0928765513000882 
Zirogiannis, Nikolaos, Jessica Alcorn, John Rupp, Sanya Carley, and John D. Graham. 2016. 
"State Regulation of Unconventional Gas Development in the US: An Empirical 
Evaluation." Energy Research & Social Science 11: 142-154. 
  
57 
 
Appendix A: Classification of counties as high investment 
 
Table 8: Classification of counties based on 75th percentile of boom counties 
                            Boom Non-boom 
Variable 75th percentile # High # Other # High # Other 
Per capita changes           
Education spending 0.751 9 26 18 302 
Highway spending 0.169 8 27 36 284 
Health and hospital spending 0.190 8 27 4 280 
Public welfare 0.014 9 26 100 220 
      
Percentage of 1982 spending 
     Education spending 0.553 9 26 127 193 
Highway spending 0.159 9 26 65 255 
Health and hospital spending 0.115 8 27 75 245 
Public welfare 0.016 9 26 107 213 
      
Absolute changes 
     Education spending 23,099 8 27 20 300 
Highway spending 3,930 8 27 10 310 
Health and hospital spending 2,879 8 27 27 293 
Public welfare 203 9 26 73 247 
      
Percentage change in spending 
     Education spending 0.049 8 27 58 262 
Highway spending 0.104 9 26 13 307 
Health and hospital spending 0.149 8 27 97 223 
Public welfare 0.019 10 25 136 184 
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Table 9: Classification of counties based on 50th percentile 
                            Boom Non-boom 
Variable 50th percentile # High # Other # High # Other 
Per capita changes 
     Education spending 0.5481 17 18 71 249 
Highway spending 0.1060 18 17 92 228 
Health and hospital spending 0.0163 18 18 133 187 
Public welfare 0.0001 17 18 211 109 
      
Percentage of 1982 spending 
     Education spending 0.488 18 17 201 119 
Highway spending 0.103 17 18 170 150 
Health and hospital spending 0.107 17 18 135 185 
Public welfare 0.003 18 17 226 84 
      
Absolute changes 
     Education spending 6,300 17 18 91 229 
Highway spending 1,573 17 18 57 263 
Health and hospital spending 222 17 18 130 190 
Public welfare 4 17 18 206 114 
      
Percentage change in spending 
     Education spending 0.0425 18 17 73 247 
Highway spending 0.0520 18 17 53 267 
Health and hospital spending 0.0521 18 17 185 135 
Public welfare -0.0010 19 16 243 77 
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Appendix B: Additional summary statistics 
 
Table 10: Summary statistics for outcome and high investment variables, observations = 356 
 Variable  Mean Std. dev Min Max 
Change in absolute spending from 1967-1982 
Change in absolute education spending 7,486 10,231 -286 58,831 
Change in absolute highway spending 1,189 1,495 -241 14,342 
Change in absolute health &  hospital spending 1,158 3,301 -1,499 37,070 
Change in absolute public welfare spending 282 1,161 -1,216 17,115 
 
Dummy variable for high absolute spending change 
Education spending 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Highway spending 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Health &  hospital spending 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Public welfare spending 0.23 0.42 0 1 
 
Percentage change in spending from 1967-1982 
Change in percentage education spending 0.04 0.08 -0.0100 1.50 
Change in percentage highway spending 0.04 0.05 -0.0039 0.52 
Change in percentage health &  hospital spending 0.34 1.38 -0.0100 16.80 
Change in percentage public welfare spending 0.04 0.17 -0.0100 2.15 
 
Dummy variable for high percentage spending change 
High percentage education spending change 0.19 0.39 0 1 
High percentage highway spending change 0.06 0.24 0 1 
High percentage health & hospital spending change 0.30 0.46 0 1 
High percentage public welfare spending change 0.41 0.49 0 1 
 
Dummy variable for high percent of total spending in 1982 
Education spending 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Highway spending 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Health &  hospital spending 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Public welfare spending 0.33 0.47 0 1 
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Appendix C: Maps showing how counties are classified  
(green=boom, dark=classified as high spending) 
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Appendix D: Tables of regression results used for robustness testing (Part 1) 
 
Table 11: Regression results for impact of boom on local government revenues, expenditures and 
savings, using year and county fixed effects with robust standard errors 
  
Local government 
revenues 
Local government 
expenditures 
Local government 
savings 
Dependent 
variable ln(revenue) 
ln(revenue 
per capita) 
ln(general 
expenditures) 
ln(general 
expenditures 
per capita) Savings 
Savings 
per 
capita 
Boom * 1972 -0.028 -0.023 -0.015 -0.010 192.857 -0.003 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (122.27) (0.01) 
       
Boom * 1977 0.092 0.058 0.070 0.036 548.324** 0.025 
 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (200.04) (0.02) 
       
Boom * 1982 0.396*** 0.251*** 0.356*** 0.211** 2022.963 0.148 
 
(0.11) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (2108.64) (0.09) 
       
Boom * 1987 0.370*** 0.269*** 0.331*** 0.230*** 5065.677* 0.111 
 
(0.11) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (2335.98) (0.06) 
       
Boom * 1992 0.180 0.126* 0.168 0.114 1391.144 0.015 
 
(0.10) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (726.09) (0.04) 
       
_cons 7.738*** -1.192*** 7.714*** -1.217*** -16.901 0.007 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (90.51) (0.01) 
       
R2 (within) 0.900 0.938 0.905 0.939 0.029 0.016 
Observations 2129 2129 2130 2130 2130 2130 
F 484.115 1203.688 512.654 1232.347 6.141 7.892 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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Table 12: Regression results for impact of boom on local government spending in specific categories, using year and county fixed effects with robust 
standard errors 
  Education Public welfare Highways Health and hospitals 
Dependent 
variable 
ln(educ 
spending) 
ln(educ 
spending 
per capita) 
ln(percent 
educ 
spending) 
ln(pw 
spending) 
ln(pw 
spending 
per 
capita) 
ln(percent 
pw 
spending) 
ln(hwy 
spending) 
ln(hwy 
spending 
per capita) 
ln(percent 
hwy 
spending) 
ln(hh 
spending) 
ln(hh 
spending 
per capita) 
ln(percent 
hh 
spending) 
Boom * 1972 0.016 0.020 0.028 -0.446** -0.446** -0.442* 0.026 0.031 0.037 -0.037 -0.028 -0.036 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) 
             
Boom * 1977 0.081 0.046 0.013 -1.011** -1.049** -1.102** 0.075 0.040 0.001 0.111 0.079 0.055 
 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.35) (0.36) (0.37) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) 
             
Boom * 1982 0.280** 0.134 -0.073 -0.335 -0.457 -0.691* 0.590*** 0.444*** 0.230** -0.068 -0.209 -0.414 
 
(0.10) (0.07) (0.04) (0.29) (0.29) (0.31) (0.13) (0.11) (0.07) (0.30) (0.29) (0.29) 
             
Boom * 1987 0.294** 0.192** -0.034 -0.546 -0.647 -0.877* 0.440*** 0.338*** 0.104 -0.075 -0.172 -0.398 
 
(0.10) (0.07) (0.04) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.26) (0.25) (0.24) 
             
Boom * 1992 0.154 0.099 -0.010 -0.623 -0.697* -0.828* 0.230* 0.176* 0.059 -0.033 -0.081 -0.190 
 
(0.09) (0.07) (0.04) (0.34) (0.34) (0.36) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.31) (0.30) (0.29) 
             
_cons 7.124*** -1.812*** -0.598*** 3.802*** -5.156*** -3.941*** 5.597*** -3.334*** -2.122*** 3.383*** -5.578*** -4.370*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
             
R2 (within) 0.868 0.884 0.049 0.356 0.326 0.117 0.795 0.811 0.129 0.483 0.459 0.046 
Observations 2124 2124 2124 1939 1939 1939 2127 2127 2127 2008 2008 2008 
F 570.622 1226.865 7.888 53.674 47.958 14.208 309.774 454.683 15.999 84.282 79.495 4.978 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, 
respectively. 
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Appendix E: Comparison of means for income per capita by spending levels 
 
Per capita income and high change in education spending 
 
   
Figure 12: Per capita income and high education spend change (dash=boom, orange=high spend) 
   
Figure 11: Per capita income and high education per capita spend change (dash=boom, 
orange=high spend) 
  
Figure 16: per capita income and high percentage education spend change (dash=boom, 
orange=high spend) 
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Per capita income and high highway spending change 
 
  
Figure 17: Per capita income and high absolute highway spend change (dash=boom, 
orange=high spend) 
  
Figure 18: Per capita income and high per capita highway spending change (dash=boom, 
orange=high spend) 
  
Figure 19: Per capita income and high percentage highway spending change (dash=boom, 
orange=high spend) 
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Per capita income and high health and hospital spending change 
 
  
Figure 20: Per capita income and high absolute health and hospital spending change 
(dash=boom, orange=high spend change) 
  
Figure 21: Per capita income and high per capita health and hospital spending change 
(dash=boom, orange=high spend change) 
  
Figure 22: Per capita income and high percentage health and hospital spending change 
(dash=boom, orange=high spend change) 
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Per capita income and high public welfare spending 
 
  
Figure 23: Per capita income and high change in absolute public welfare spending 
(dash=boom, orange=high spend) 
  
Figure 24: Per capita income and high per capita change in public welfare spending  
(dash=boom, orange=high spend) 
  
Figure 25: Per capita income and high percentage public welfare spending  
(dash=boom, orange=high spend) 
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Appendix F: Tables of regression results used for robustness testing (Part 2) 
 
Table 13: Regression results for impact of high absolute changes in spending on log per capita income for boom and non-boom 
counties, using year and county fixed effects with robust standard errors 
  Boom Non-boom 
Interaction term High absolute change in  High absolute change in 
Education Highways Hospitals Public welfare Education Highways Hospitals Public welfare 
Dependent variable ln(income per capita) ln(income per capita) 
Interaction term * EB 0.143* 0.109 0.158** 0.037 0.049** 0.059** 0.041** 0.065*** 
  (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
         
Interaction term * PB 0.186** 0.122 0.179** 0.046 0.087*** 0.126*** 0.101*** 0.127*** 
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
         
Interaction term * LB 0.137** 0.083 0.132* 0.087* 0.053** 0.095** 0.035 0.082*** 
  (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
         
Interaction term *  BUST 0.129** 0.072 0.110* 0.123** 0.048* 0.083* 0.061* 0.069*** 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
         
_cons 8.908*** 8.908*** 8.908*** 8.908*** 8.844*** 8.844*** 8.844*** 8.844*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
         
R2 (within) 0.367 0.349 0.366 0.360 0.402 0.403 0.403 0.411 
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 9600 9600 9600 9600 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance level, respectively. 
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Table 14: Regression results for impact of high percentage changes in spending on log per capita income for boom and non-boom 
counties, using year and county fixed effects with robust standard errors 
  Boom Non-boom 
Interaction term High percentage change in  High percentage change in 
Education Highways Hospitals Public welfare Education Highways Hospitals Public welfare 
Dependent variable ln(income per capita) ln(income per capita) 
Interaction term * EB 0.110 -0.004 0.058 -0.042 0.051*** 0.045* -0.011 0.032** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
         
Interaction term * PB 0.169* 0.082 0.081 -0.102 0.128*** 0.117** -0.030 0.005 
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
         
Interaction term * LB 0.064 0.048 0.066 -0.052 0.047* 0.069 -0.004 0.022 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
         
Interaction term * BUST 0.032 -0.040 0.102* -0.084 0.028 0.070 -0.019 0.000 
  (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) 
         
_cons 8.908*** 8.908*** 8.908*** 8.908*** 8.844*** 8.844*** 8.844*** 8.844*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
         
R2 (within) 0.355 0.347 0.349 0.347 0.407 0.403 0.401 0.402 
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 9600 9600 9600 9600 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance level, respectively. 
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Table 15: Regression results for impact of high percentage spending on category in 1982 on per capita income for boom and non-
boom counties, using year and countyfixed effects with robust standard errors 
  Boom Non-boom 
Interaction term  High percentage of spending in 1982  High percentage of spending in 1982  
Education Highways Hospitals Public welfare Education Highways Hospitals Public welfare 
Dependent variable  ln(per capita income) ln(per capita income) 
Interaction term * EB  -0.039 -0.061 0.028 -0.050 -0.007 -0.051** -0.029* 0.006 
  (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
         
Interaction term * PB  -0.136 -0.008 0.024 -0.050 -0.067** -0.163*** 0.012 -0.018 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
         
Interaction term * LB -0.051 -0.012 0.024 -0.002 -0.025 -0.031 -0.021 0.028 
  (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
         
Interaction term * BUST 0.002 -0.120 0.075 -0.003 -0.023 -0.023 -0.016 -0.011 
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
         
_cons 8.908*** 8.908*** 8.908*** 8.908*** 8.844*** 8.844*** 8.844*** 8.844*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
         
R2 (within) 0.348 0.362 0.343 0.338 0.404 0.412 0.402 0.402 
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 9600 9600 9600 9600 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
  
73 
 
Table 16: Regression results for impact of high spending change on log per capita income, using year and county fixed effects with 
robust standard errors (subgroups based on investment and independent variables are periods of the boom) 
  Education Highways Hospitals Public welfare 
Subgroup  
High 
absolute 
change 
Low 
absolute 
change 
High 
absolute 
change 
Low 
absolute 
change 
High 
absolute 
change 
Low 
absolute 
change 
High 
absolute 
change 
Low 
absolute 
change 
Dependent 
variable  ln(income per capita) ln(income per capita) ln(income per capita) ln(income per capita) 
Boom * EB 0.110* 0.016 0.075 0.022 0.130** 0.013 0.023 0.050 
  (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
         
Boom * PB 0.161** 0.061 0.076 0.074* 0.146* 0.065* 0.035 0.115** 
  (0.06) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
         
Boom * LB 0.068 -0.018 -0.009 -0.006 0.081 -0.017 0.012 0.007 
  (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
         
Boom * BUST -0.008 -0.091*** -0.083 -0.079** -0.034 -0.085** -0.026 -0.081** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
         
_cons 8.888*** 8.849*** 8.931*** 8.848*** 8.921*** 8.845*** 8.808*** 8.866*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
         
R2 (within) 0.713 0.390 0.613 0.390 0.610 0.389 0.554 0.377 
Observations 870 9840 570 10140 1080 9630 2490 8220 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance level, respectively. 
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Table 17: Regression results for impact of high percentage spending change on log per capita income, using year and county fixed 
effects with robust standard errors (subgroups based on investment and independent variables are periods of the boom) 
 Education Highways Hospitals Public welfare 
Subgroup 
High 
percentage 
change 
Low 
percentage 
change 
High 
percentage 
change 
Low 
percentage 
change 
High 
percentage 
change 
Low 
percentage 
change 
High 
percentage 
change 
Low 
percentage 
change 
Dependent 
variable ln(income per capita) ln(income per capita) ln(income per capita) ln(income per capita) 
Boom * EB 0.088 0.029 0.001 0.048* 0.097 0.029 -0.003 0.071** 
 
(0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
         Boom * PB 0.124* 0.082* 0.050 0.082* 0.181** 0.070* 0.022 0.129*** 
 
(0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) 
         Boom * LB 0.022 0.004 -0.015 0.001 0.064 -0.006 -0.039 0.034 
 
(0.06) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
         Boom 
*BUST -0.062 -0.067* -0.158 -0.052* 0.027 -0.094*** -0.125* -0.040 
 
(0.05) (0.03) (0.08) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
         _cons 8.881*** 8.846*** 8.860*** 8.852*** 8.851*** 8.853*** 8.820*** 8.875*** 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
         R2 (within) 0.420 0.407 0.411 0.398 0.377 0.407 0.407 0.397 
Observations 2010 8700 690 10020 3180 7530 4410 6300 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance level, respectively. 
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Table 18: Regression results for impact of high percentage  of 1982 spending on log per capita income, using year and countyfixed 
effects with robust standard errors (subgroups based on investment and independent variables are periods of the boom) 
  Education Highways Hospitals Public welfare 
Subgroup  High % spending in 
1982 
Low % 
spending 
change in 
1982 
High % 
spending in 
1982 
Low % 
spending 
change in 
1982 
High % 
spending in 
1982 
Low % 
spending 
change in 
1982 
High % 
spending in 
1982 
Low % 
spending 
change in 
1982 
Dependent 
variable  ln(income per capita) ln(income per capita) ln(income per capita) ln(income per capita) 
Boom * EB 0.021 0.052 0.040 0.050* 0.088* 0.032 0.004 0.060* 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
         
Boom * PB 0.036 0.106*** 0.219** 0.067* 0.106* 0.095* 0.072 0.105** 
  (0.07) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
         
Boom * LB -0.013 0.014 0.026 0.007 0.045 -0.000 -0.009 0.020 
  (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) 
         
Boom * 
BUST -0.049 -0.074** -0.136* -0.038 0.005 -0.085** -0.060 -0.067* 
  (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
         
_cons 8.801*** 8.884*** 8.871*** 8.847*** 8.908*** 8.835*** 8.840*** 8.858*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
         
R2 (within) 0.425 0.386 0.420 0.430 0.380 0.406 0.394 0.409 
Observations 4110 6600 2250 8460 2520 8190 3510 7200 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance level, respectively. 
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Appendix G: Tables of regression results used for robustness testing of boom level specification 
Table 19: Regression results for impact of boom on local government revenues, spending and savings when boom level = 100 extra 
wells, using year and county fixed effects with robust standard errors 
 
Local government revenue Local government expenditures Local government savings 
Dependent 
variable ln(revenue) ln(revenue per capita) ln(expenditures) 
ln(expenditures per 
capita) Savings 
Savings per 
capita  
Boom * 1972 -0.018 -0.013 0.009 0.014 153.611 -0.008 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (99.76) (0.01) 
       
Boom * 1977 0.081 0.071 0.098 0.088* 432.774 -0.009 
  (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (235.12) (0.03) 
       
Boom * 1982 0.285*** 0.218*** 0.274*** 0.207*** 1694.557 0.100 
  (0.09) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (1420.57) (0.06) 
       
Boom * 1987 0.292** 0.265*** 0.268** 0.242*** 4164.709* 0.146** 
  (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (1615.33) (0.06) 
       
Boom * 1992 0.135 0.162** 0.133 0.161** 2285.648 0.166 
  (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (1233.15) (0.14) 
       
_cons 7.738*** -1.192*** 7.714*** -1.217*** -16.901 0.007 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (89.51) (0.01) 
R2 (within) 0.899 0.939 0.905 0.940 0.030 0.023 
Observations 2129 2129 2130 2130 2130 2130 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance level, respectively. 
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Table 20: Regression results for impact of boom on local government revenues, spending and savings when boom level = 300 extra 
wells, using year and county fixed effects with robust standard errors 
 
Local government revenue Local government expenditures Local government savings 
Dependent 
variable ln(revenue) 
ln(revenue per 
capita) ln(expenditures) 
ln(expenditures per 
capita) Savings 
Savings per 
capita  
Boom * 1972 0.017 0.012 0.070 0.064 144.104 -0.017 
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (168.58) (0.02) 
       
Boom * 1977 0.203 0.090 0.222* 0.109 375.369 0.004 
  (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (231.46) (0.02) 
       
Boom * 1982 0.640*** 0.357** 0.611*** 0.327*** 2973.592 0.221 
  (0.16) (0.11) (0.14) (0.10) (3583.50) (0.13) 
       
Boom * 1987 0.594*** 0.364*** 0.570*** 0.340*** 8226.494* 0.153 
  (0.16) (0.10) (0.14) (0.09) (3878.76) (0.09) 
       
Boom * 1992 0.402** 0.197* 0.405** 0.201* 2284.198* 0.031 
  (0.13) (0.08) (0.13) (0.08) (1072.06) (0.04) 
       
_cons 7.738*** -1.192*** 7.714*** -1.217*** -16.901 0.007 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (89.25) (0.01) 
       
R2 (within) 0.901 0.938 0.907 0.940 0.041 0.019 
Observations 2129 2129 2130 2130 2130 2130 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance level, respectively. 
78 
 
Table 21: Regression results for local government spending in specific categories when boom level = 100 extra wells, using year and county fixed 
effects with robust standard errors 
 
Education Public welfare Highways Health & hospitals 
Dependent variable 
ln(spending) Total Per capita Percent Total Per capita Percent Total Per capita Percent Total Per capita Percent 
Boom * 1972 0.167 0.171 0.043* -0.420** -0.412** -0.438** -0.084 -0.079 -0.097 -0.002 0.003 -0.024 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.02) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
             
Boom * 1977 0.193* 0.181* 0.029 -0.840** -0.855** -0.956*** -0.004 -0.015 -0.106 0.276 0.267 0.184 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.02) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) 
             
Boom * 1982 0.339*** 0.271** 0.010 -0.407 -0.461 -0.677* 0.356** 0.289** 0.078 0.153 0.088 -0.117 
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.02) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) 
             
Boom * 1987 0.323*** 0.296*** 0.002 -0.362 -0.385 -0.627* 0.277** 0.250** 0.004 0.265 0.237 0.002 
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.02) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) 
             
Boom * 1992 0.191* 0.217* 0.007 -0.476 -0.466 -0.651* 0.053 0.080 -0.084 0.092 0.130 -0.028 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.02) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.27) (0.26) (0.25) 
             
_cons 7.124*** -1.812*** 0.563*** 3.801*** -5.157*** -3.942*** 5.597*** -3.334*** -2.122*** 3.385*** -5.576*** -4.369*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
             
R2 (within) 0.869 0.886 0.106 0.356 0.325 0.117 0.793 0.811 0.129 0.483 0.460 0.044 
Observations 2124 2124 2130 1939 1939 1939 2127 2127 2127 2008 2008 2008 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, 
respectively. 
79 
 
Table 22: Regression results for local government spending in specific categories when boom level = 300 extra wells, using year and county fixed 
effects with robust standard errors 
 
Education Public welfare Highways Health & hospitals 
Dependent  
variable 
ln(spending) Total Per capita Percent Total Per capita Percent Total Per capita Percent Total Per capita Percent 
Boom * 1972 0.099 0.092 0.002 -0.537* -0.552* -0.623** 0.075 0.069 0.002 0.343 0.332 0.251 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.01) (0.22) (0.22) (0.24) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) 
             
Boom * 1977 0.196 0.082 -0.014 -1.074* -1.189* -1.298* 0.198* 0.084 -0.028 0.431 0.318 0.214 
  (0.11) (0.09) (0.02) (0.49) (0.51) (0.52) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.31) (0.30) (0.31) 
             
Boom * 1982 0.469** 0.184 -0.070*** -0.200 -0.445 -0.805 0.868*** 0.584*** 0.253* 0.434 0.155 -0.168 
  (0.15) (0.11) (0.02) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.15) (0.13) (0.10) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) 
             
Boom * 1987 0.465*** 0.234* -0.055* -0.024 -0.240 -0.599 0.656*** 0.425*** 0.082 0.278 0.052 -0.284 
  (0.14) (0.10) (0.02) (0.50) (0.49) (0.48) (0.15) (0.13) (0.10) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) 
             
Boom * 1992 0.326** 0.120 -0.047* -0.559 -0.788 -1.012* 0.534*** 0.329*** 0.126 0.282 0.082 -0.114 
  (0.13) (0.09) (0.02) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.36) (0.37) (0.35) 
             
_cons 7.124*** -1.812*** 0.563*** 3.803*** -5.156*** -3.940*** 5.597*** -3.334*** -2.122*** 3.384*** -5.577*** -4.369*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
             
R2 (within) 0.869 0.884 0.107 0.355 0.325 0.114 0.797 0.810 0.128 0.483 0.459 0.045 
Observations 2124 2124 2130 1939 1939 1939 2127 2127 2127 2008 2008 2008 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, 
respectively. 
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Appendix H:  Comparison of means for spending groups using 50th percentile 
to test robustness 
 
  
Figure 26: Per capita income and high per capita education change using 50th percentile 
(dash=boom, orange=high spend change) 
  
Figure 27: Per capita income and high per capita highway change using 50th percentile 
(dash=boom, orange=high spend change) 
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Figure 28: Per capita income and high per capita health and hospital change using 50th percentile 
(dash=boom, orange=high spend change) 
  
Figure 29: Per capita income and high per capita public welfare change using 50th percentile 
(dash=boom, orange=high spend change) 
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